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ABSTRACT 
WŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƌŝƐŬŝƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞĐƌƵĐŝĂůĨĂĐƚŽƌƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐŝŶŐƚŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůŵĂƌŬĞƚĂƐ
widely claimed by numerous studies. Many examples of the events which are considered as a 
political risk are the switch in regimen, a revolution, a coup incident, or a civil war. In Thailand, one 
ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ ƌĞĐĞŶƚ ŝŶĐŝĚĞŶƚƐ ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ
received much of public attention worldwide is the 2006-military coup. Not only the coup itself, the 
demonstrations by all groups of people both for and against the government also play an important 
ƌŽůĞ ŝŶ ĐĂƵƐŝŶŐ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƌŝƐŬ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ĂŶĚ ĂĨĨĞĐƚ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ? ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ƚŽ ŝŶǀĞƐƚ ŝŶ dŚĂŝ ƐƚŽĐŬ
market. The most common way I think fŽƌ ƚŚŝƐ ƌŝƐŬ ƚŽ ƚƌĂŶƐŵŝƚ ŝƚƐ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ ƐƚŽĐŬ
market is through the announcement of political news. That is, investors reevaluate their investment 
plans after the recognition of political situation in the country from those news.  
Regarding to this assumption, it is thus interesting to investigate the impact of political news on Thai 
stock market. Though there are abundant of existing academic literatures in this area, Thailand 
provides a unique research context due to the complication in its political system and its position as 
a developing country. The main model I used here for the analysis is the Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroscedasticity in mean or GARCH-in-mean model. The distinctiveness of this model 
is that it takes account of risk as measured by the time-varying variance (or volatility term) in the 
estimation of stock returns. In particular, this implies the relationship between risk and return of the 
assets. Based on the concept of the GARCH-M model, three model specifications were identified in 
order to examine the impact of favorable and unfavorable political news on stock returns and 
volatility which are GARCH (1,1)-M, EGARCH, and APARCH model where the APARCH is the most 
general form of the other two. Note that the EGARCH and APARCH model specifications are selected 
to be used because their ability in capturing the asymmetric effect of the impact between favorable 
and unfavorable news on stock return. For the stock data, I employed a historical daily data of the 
SET index returns. This is a composite index which composes the price of all common stock traded in 
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Thai stock market. The study period of this dissertation starts from January 1, 2004 to October 1, 
2008. Moreover, this is separated into two sub-periods which pre- and post-coup period. 
Mainly, there are four hypotheses to be tested in this study including 1) there is a difference in stock 
market volatility between the event day and non-event day 2) the difference in stock market 
volatility between the event and non-event day is higher after the coup 3) major political news has a 
significant impact on both stock market returns and volatility and 4) the impact of major political 
news on stock market returns and volatility was amplified after the coup incident. For the first two 
hypotheses, the results from a nonparametric Mann-Whitney test show that stock volatilities in the 
event day are significantly difference from those in the non-event days in both pre- and post-coup 
period. Besides, it is apparently proved that SET index returns appear to be negative on the day in 
which unfavorable news was released and the opposite occur on the day in which favorable news 
was released. 
For the third and fourth hypotheses, the results from estimating the GARCH (1,1)-in-mean, the 
EGARCH, and the APRACH model specifications indicate a significant impact of 
favorable(unfavorable) news on the increase(decrease) in SET index returns. Similarly, both types of 
news also have a significant effect on SET index volatility in a way that it increases the volatility of 
the stock market. An incredibly surprising finding is that the effect of positive and negative political 
news on stock returns is symmetric which is rare in the real world. However, we failed to find an 
evidence of the latest coup on stock return and its amplification effect as well as the risk premium, 
though a significant impact of coup on stock volatility is evidenced. Lastly, the leverage effect of 
political news on stock market has been found also the persistence of shocks from the news on stock 
volatility. In conclusion, these results imply the importance of political instability on the health of 
Thai stock market.  
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Chapter I Ȃ Introduction  
It is no doubt that political risks is regarded as one of the most vital risks to every countries 
because the damage created by this risk can costs a significant amount of money and the 
ƌŝƐŬ ŝƚƐĞůĨ ĂĨĨĞĐƚƐ ďŽƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ ŵĂĐƌŽ- and micro-level economic system. Basically, 
political risks can come in many forms such as a new piece of legislation, coup, an election, 
Žƌ Ă ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ ƌĞŐŝŵĞŶ ǁŚĞƌĞ ŵĂŶǇ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƐƚ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ƵƐĞĚ ƚŽ
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ĂĚǀĞƌƐĞ ŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƌŝƐŬƐŽŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐĞconomy. For instance, 
Fiji, which once used a coup as a weapon to overthrow the democratic government, was 
hurt on its economy due to this political risk especially in the post-1987 period as reported 
that the May 2000 coup has caused an economic depression, a slump in tourism industry, 
ĂŶĚƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶĞĚƚŚĞĐŽůůĂƉƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƐƵŐĂƌĂŶĚŐĂƌŵĞŶƚŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĞƐ ?K ?ƌŝĞŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĞƐŝĚĞƐ ?ŝƚ
ǁĂƐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĚƚŚĂƚ&ŝũŝ ?ƐŐƌŽƐƐĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐƉƌŽĚƵĐƚĨĞůů  ? ? ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚĂĨƚĞƌƚŚŝƐĐŽƵƉĂŶĚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞ
long-run, real national welfare and real consumption is expected to fall by around 7 and 2 
per cent, respectively (Narayan and Prasad, 2007).  
Another apparent empirical case of the impact of political event on the whole economy is 
the sudden and devastating tragedy of September 11th, 2001 in the US. Definitely, it cannot 
be rejected that the most harmful part of all terrorism is the destruction of lives but the 
impact on economic system is another issue that should also be concerned. Though it was 
said that the effect of the 9/11 terrorism was only a short-term moderate effect because of 
the action of the Federal Reserve to facilitate the credit available to the consumer by cutting 
the interest rate and add more liquidity to banks in the face of crises by lessening the 
borrowing requirement for the banks, the long-term effects of the attack has continued for 
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ƐŽŵĞ ƉĞƌŝŽĚ ŽĨ ƚŝŵĞ ? dŚĂƚ ŝƐ ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐĂ ĚĞĐƌĞĂƐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ƐƚŽĐŬĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ
consumers and investors lost their confidences due to this political uncertainty as revealed 
by the poll from CNN that 40 percent of the respondents planned to cut back their spending 
and 42 percent want to reduce their travel expenditure (Kheifetz, 2005).  
According to the Report for Congress by Makinen (2002), it is estimated that about 130 
thousand people lost their job owing to this attack. Moreover, certain industries was also 
seriously affected by the 9/11 incident especially the airline, hotel, and insurance industries. 
The airline industry faced a heavy loss from the lack of consumer confidence and the 
insurance companies was put in trouble because of a huge amount of insurance claim 
caused by this kind of terrorism which has never been occurred before in the American 
history. On top of that, the biggest long-term effect seems to be the security cost which will 
be charged more to the consumer in many industries such as transportation, power 
stations, and especially the airline industry. 
Political risks not only cause an unpleasant impact on the macro-level economy, but 
extreme political events also affect the economy on a micro-level as well. Many empirical 
ǁŽƌŬƐŚĂǀĞĞǆĂŵŝŶĞĚƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƌŝƐŬƐĞŝƚŚĞƌŽŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĞƐŽƌƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ
stock market however much of those works focused on the political issues in developed 
countries and less works are carried out in the context of emerging or developing countries 
even though the political environment in these countries is less stable which make them a 
motivating topic for the research purpose. One developing country where political situation 
was now being in public attention is Thailand. In particular, it is now being deemed as one of 
the highest political risks when compared with its regional peers. According to the risk 
indicator measured by the risk analysis firm, IHS Global Insight, Thailand is the country with 
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highest perceived risk that the company should be aware when operating the business in 
the country. Currently, its risk rating is equal to 3.25 while Malaysia, Indonesia, and 
WŚŝůŝƉƉŝŶĞ ?Ɛ ƌĂƚŝŶŐ ŝƐ  ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ĂŶĚ  ? ? ? ? ?
respectively. Likewise, the WGI project 
conducted by the World Bank which revealed 
ƚŚĂƚ dŚĂŝůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞ ǁŽƌůĚ ƌĂŶŬŝŶŐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ
degree of political instability was higher year 
by year from 31.7 in 2004 to 12.9 in 2008 
(Chalmers, 2009). Also, the Global Political Risk 
/ŶĚĞǆ ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ƵƌĂƐŝĂ ?Ɛ ŐƌŽƵƉ ? ƚŚĞ
ǁŽƌůĚ ?Ɛ ůĞĂĚŝŶŐ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƌŝƐŬ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ĂŶĚ
consulting firm, shows that Thailand is another 
country, apart from Russia and Pakistan, in 
which political risks is on the rise. The risk 
composite scores which is calculated from 20 
indicators in four equally weighted categories 
including government, society, security, and 
economy is exhibited in figure 1. This score ranges from 0 to 100. The higher the score, the 
ŵŽƌĞƐƚĂďůĞƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇǁŚĞƌĞdŚĂŝůĂŶĚ ?ƐĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚĞ score is 62 (Lesova, 2008). All of these 
indexes and ratings emphasize the image of political risky country of Thailand in the view of 
both domestics and foreign investors.  
Talking about political situation in Thailand, basically political distress in this country began 
to be more aggressive during the last 5 years. Different viewpoints about political issues in 
Ɣ Ɣ Ɣ 
Figure 1 Global political risk index 
 
Ɣ Ɣ Ɣ 
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Thailand has caused a disharmony among Thai people and resulted in two main separate 
political groups: pro-government and anti-government, so-called red-shirt (PPP) and yellow-
shirt (PAD). The demonstrations of these two groups both against and for the former Prime 
Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, became more severe as day goes by particularly when the 
excuse of the yellow-shirt people was related to the stability of the Royal Family. The 
situation is even more violent after the 2006-coup and when Abhisit Vejjajiva was 
nominated as a new Prime Minister by the congress while the red-shirt felt that PM Abhisit 
does not acquire his position rightfully and transparently and called for a new democratic 
election by holding a big rally in the center area of Bangkok. The harshest political incident 
in the last decade of Thai history happened on the 10th of April 2010 when PM Abhisit 
released an order for the army to terminate the red-shirt rally, which killed at least 25 
people, followed by the Emergency Decree announcement.  
Apparently, it was widely known that those political events adversely affect the confidence 
of both domestic and foreign investors as the volatility of stock market is increased which 
lead to the uncertainty of the investment expected cash flows. This fact is quite practical not 
only in emerging or developing countries but also in the European countries which have a 
more developed political ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ĂƐ ƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇ ƌĞǀŝĞǁĞĚ ďǇ ƉƉƐ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ZĞƵƚĞƌƐ ?ƌ ƉŽƌƚĞƌ ?
that  “ ?Ĩ ?ƌŽŵƐŽƵƚŚĞƌŶƵƌŽƉĞ ?ƐĚĞďƚĐƌŝƐŝƐƚŽh ?^ ?ďĂŶŬŝŶŐƌĞĨŽƌŵ ?ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐŚĂƐĞŵĞƌŐĞĚĂƐĂ
driver of volatility in Western markets this year in a way normally more associated with 
emerging ecŽŶŽŵŝĞƐ ?. For this reason, it can thus be anticipated that the impact of these 
ƌŝƐŬƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ ƐƚŽĐŬ ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ ƐŝŐŶŝĨĐĂŶƚ ĂŶĚ ŝƚ ŝƐ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐ ? ĨŽƌ ďŽƚŚ
academic and business administrative aspects, to explore how political risks contribute to 
the movement in stock market. This fact leads to the theme of this dissertation that is to 
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ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ŽĨ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƌŝƐŬƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ǀŽůĂƚŝůŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ŽĨ dŚĂŝůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ƐƚŽĐŬ
market. More specifically, the effect of the release of political news regarding major political 
events in the country on stock returns and volatility will be inspected by employing a well-
known nonlinear GARCH model. This model was used extensively in many previous 
academic works concerning the influence of news upon security prices. The outline of this 
dissertation is as followings: next chapter reviews existing academic literatures associated 
with the impact of a specific tremendous event both political and economic on stock returns 
and volatility in different countries. The third chapter is a brief summary about Thailand 
political background and major political events which are expected to have an important 
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŽŶƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐƐƚŽĐŬŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?dŚĞĨŽƵƌƚŚĐŚĂƉƚĞƌŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐĂĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐƚŽĐŬ
data, a framework and statistical models which will be utilized for the investigation of the 
impact of political news on stock returns and volatility also includes the preliminary data 
analysis. The fifth chapter exhibits the empirical results found from the estimation and the 
teƐƚ ŽĨ ŵŽĚĞůƐ ? ƌŽďƵƐƚŶĞƐƐ ĂŶĚ ƌĞůŝĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? &ŝŶĂůůǇ ? ůĂƐƚ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ŝƐ Ă ĐŽŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ƌĞŵĂƌŬ
discussing about all crucial implications derived from this study as well as some limitations 
and a suggestive direction for future researches. 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
Chapter II - Literature Reviews 
The behavior and fluctuation of security prices during the period of dramatic events have 
undergone an extensive empirical investigation by the researchers for a long time. 
Unexpected events can produce so much stress and uncertainty that market participants are 
unable to accurately and rationally assess the value of a security which in turn, causes 
volatility in the market. In this direction, a large number of papers have examined the 
behavior of security price when there is an uncertainty in financial markets after the 
turbulent phenomena and a review of some of those papers is presented below. 
2.1) The Relationship between Political Risk and Security Prices  
The relationship between political risk and stock market which is the main focus of this 
dissertation is one of the interesting issues that has been explored by a numerous academic 
literatures both in the developed and emerging countries especially in this modern era 
where there is a rapid development in a communication system which enables an individual 
to access all political information and quickly response to that news. One of the recent 
researches in this area is introduced by Chuang and Wang (2009). Basically, they aimed to 
examine the effects of political change (which is defined in the paper as the transition of 
ruling party in president and prime ministers) in developed stock markets by adopting a 
panel data analysis as a methodology since it is assumed that the country-specific effect 
exists. The data utilized in this paper for the analysis is the daily stock return data for 
individual country indices including Nikkei 225, SBF-250, FTSE 30, and Dow Jones 30. 
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Generally, there are two techniques of the panel data analysis. Each of which has different 
assumptions and fits the data with different characteristics, that is, the fixed effect model 
takes a country-ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ĂƐ Ă ĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚ ƚĞƌŵ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƌĞŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ĨŝǆĞĚ ?
indicates that the country-specific term does not vary over time while, in the random-effect 
model, country-specific effects are treated as stochastic thus it changes over time. Here, the 
paper performed a Hausman test to determine the preferred model and the result showed 
that the fixed-effect model is a preferable one. By using this model, stock returns of each 
country in each time period are regressed on a set of dummy variable reflecting political 
change impact, a one-period lagged stock returns, a constant term represents individual 
specific variable, and a residual.  
The empirical results from the fixed-effect model indicated that a political change dummy 
coefficient is significantly negative at 5% significant level on all stock markets which is an 
indicative of negative relationship between the American, Japanese, British, and French 
stock returns and political changes. The 1987 crash dummy shows that DJIA, Nikkei 25, SBF-
250, and FTSE 30 are significantly negative at the 5% level. Moreover, analytical findings 
suggested that political change effect on stock returns after the 1987 crash significantly 
exceeded those prior to the crash. Prior to the 1987 crash, the confusion in economic and 
finance policies, the clash and conflict of Congress or Parliament policies, and slow policy 
performance cause an uncertainty to the market thus these factors negatively influence and 
create uncertainties in the national economy. However, after the 1987 crash, there are an 
increasing numbers of specialists and economists involved in government policy planning; 
consequently, political change in this period has positively affectĞĚ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ
economic performance. 
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With a resemble objective, Goonatilake and Herath (2007) conducted a research to examine 
the relation between stock market fluctuation and the release of political news in three 
stock markets including DJIA, NASDAQ, and S&P 500 for a consecutive period of ten weeks 
beginning July 3, 2006 and ending on September 10, 2006. Their primary approach to 
analyze the effects of political news on stock volatility is to categorize political news into 
three types: good news, bad news, and neutral news and used the chi-square independent 
test to investigate the relationship between number of news and the movement of stock 
returns (decrease, increase, or unchanged). The result produced by a chi-square test 
demonstrated that there is sufficient evidence of the association between the nature of the 
number of news items and the market fluctuations in all sample stock markets. For the news 
analysis, they also used an ANOVA single factor analysis in order to test the difference in the 
mean of the number of sample news in each category over the period of ten weeks. The 
result indicated that the population means of three news items categories are not all the 
same. This result is confirmed by the multiple comparison test of the number of news 
population means as the good news items vs. bad news items and bad news items vs. 
neutral news items are statistically significant. Finally, the relation between sample stock 
markets fluctuation and the movement of crude oil prices is examined. According to the test 
statistics from a chi-square test, it was evidenced that there is an association between stock 
markets fluctuation and the crude oil price in the way that the oil prices increase/decrease 
in the same direction with the stock markets. 
The work by Chan and Wei (1996) provided a more focused research on political risk and 
stock price volatility by comparing and contrasting the effect of political news release about 
the Sino-British confrontation between the blue-chip and red-chip stocks in Hong Kong. In 
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the paper, the blue-chip shares are represented by the well-known index called the Hang-
Seng index and the red-ĐŚŝƉ ƐŚĂƌĞƐ ĂƌĞ ƚŚĞ ƐƚŽĐŬƐ ĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ WĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ ZĞƉƵďůŝĐ ŽĨ
China (PRC) state-owned enterprises. The study period begins on January 1, 1990 to July 8, 
1992 and it was divided into two sub-periods: before and after the government Patten. In 
order to analyze the effect of confrontation news on stock price volatility, the selected 
methodology is to use a modified GARCH-M model by adding several dummy variable 
including a news dummy (indicates good news or bad news), the Patten administration 
dummy, and the events day dummy into the model.  
dŚĞ ŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ƉĂƉĞƌ ĂƌĞ Ă ? ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ŶĞǁƐ ĂĨĨĞĐƚ ,ŽŶŐ <ŽŶŐ ?Ɛ ƐƚŽĐŬ
market volatility or not b) whether the effect get higher after Patten took office or not and 
c) is there any difference between the impact of political news on red-chip and blue-chip 
shares. For the first hypothesis, the empirical results from a nonparametric Wilcoxon test 
for the equality of stock market volatilities indicated that stock volatilities of Hang-Seng 
index and red-chip shares are statistically significant between the event and the non-event 
days both before and after Patten arrived. When examining the other two hypotheses by 
using the GARCH-M model, the results from testing a variance equation showed that 
political news has increased blue-chip volatility especially during the Patten period. 
Moreover, the evidence suggested that favorable political news caused blue-chip shares a 
higher positive return than red-ship shares and vice versa for unfavorable news. However, 
ǁŚĞŶĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐƵůƚ ĨƌŽŵ ƚĞƐƚŝŶŐ ƐƚŽĐŬŵĞĂŶ ƌĞƚƵƌŶƐ ? ŝƚǁĂƐ ĨŽƵŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ?
reaction to political news was not amplified for blue-chip shares after Patten arrived. For the 
red-chip index, it was found that political news increased volatility more than the blue-chip 
shares. Whereas, in contrast to the blue-chip shares, favorable (unfavorable) political news 
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did not increase (decrease) the expected returns of the Red-chip index. Consequently, it was 
concluded that red-chip stocks are considered a safe haven from political shocks for 
investors on the Hong Kong economy. 
The relation between political risk and security prices is examined by many scholars not only 
in the context of developed countries but also emerging countries. For example, Wang and 
Lin (2009) investigated the response of stock market to political uncertainty during 
congressional sessions in Taiwan. By using daily data on the Taiwan Stock Exchange Value 
Weighted Index (TAIEX) movements from February 24, 1984 to January 31, 2004, the 
EGARCH model is selected as a preferred model when compared with the GJR GARCH model 
according to the result from the Likelihood Ratio Test. In particular, the objective of the 
paper is to find the answers for three questions including whether or not congressional 
sessions exert an influence on stock returns and volatility, whether or not democratization 
(as reflected by the democratically presidential election in Taiwan) influence stock returns 
and volatility, and whether or not the interaction effect between congressional and 
democratization influence stock returns and volatility. Here, these effects are captured by 
adding congressional sessions and democratization dummy variables into the model. 
The results suggested that congressional sessions cause a significant negative effect on stock 
returns. In contrast, this uncertainty is not a crucial variable to the stock market volatility. 
When consider the coefficient of democratization dummy variable, it was found that the 
effect of democratization on stock returns is similar to that of the congressional sessions. 
That is, the democratic election resulted in a significantly negative stock return. Likewise, 
the stock market volatility was increased following democratization in Taiwan to 
significantly exceed volatility previous to such changes. Finally, the findings from the paper 
11 
 
demonstrated an interesting results that during the congressional sĞƐƐŝŽŶƐ ?dĂŝǁĂŶ ?ƐƐƚŽĐŬ
returns after democratization significantly exceed those prior to democratization, but stock 
volatility do not display significant. This result is not consistent with the expectation that the 
uncertainty generated from congressional effects will cause a negative shock on financial 
markets.  
Ismail and Suhardjo (2001) presented an interesting study about the impact of domestic 
political events on Indonesian stock market which examines the validity of the efficient 
market hypothesis (EMH) and the effect of political events on both the overall economy and 
a specific industry. The scope of this paper is concentrated on all industry sectors in Jakarta 
Stock Exchange (JSX) and the data are obtained from daily closing price of market indices 
comprises of composite index and the indices in each sector. 11 domestic political events 
from November 1999 to February 2001 are selected according to the event identification 
criteria of the paper and the stock returns before and during each event will be determined 
in order to test the hypotheses. The paper utilized an event study as a methodology to test 
the level of market efficiency and the reaction of stock market to domestic political events. 
Mainly, two hypotheses have been set; a) domestic political events produces zero abnormal 
returns and b) average abnormal returns of post-event are not different significantly from 
those of pre-event. Like other literatures, the mean-adjusted returns model was employed 
to estimate the expected returns which will be used to calculate the abnormal returns 
afterwards.  
In order to test the hypotheses, the t-statistics test will be performed to determine the 
difference in the cross-industry and the overall industries abnormal returns before and after 
the event day. The results from the test are mixed; out of 11 cases, there are only two cases 
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in which the industries as a whole and the composite index responded to the political events 
on the day of the event while there are three cases where the industries as a whole and the 
composite index reacted differently. That is, considerable abnormal return was found in the 
event period for the industries as a whole while the composite index experienced significant 
abnormal returns before the events occurred. For other political events, the whole 
industries and the composite index did not respond at all. These mixed responses lead to a 
conclusion that no conclusives statement can be made regarding the semi-strong form 
market efficiency of the JSX. Moreover, the change in the abnormal returns signs 
(positive/negative) suggested that the political environment in Indonesia was still unstable. 
Lastly, Aktas and Oncu (2006) presented an empirical finding of the stock market reaction to 
the rejection of bill authorizing the deployment of U.S. Troops in Turkey on March 3, 2003 
which is viewed as a political extreme event of the country. Turkey is an interesting country 
for the research purpose since it stands in a position between a developed and developing 
country. On the one hand, the political situation in this country is now similar to other 
developing countries such as Thailand, Vietnam, or Indonesia as the true democracy is now 
being established in the country (Nuraddin, 2008). On the others, some parts of the country 
such as the western area are considerably more developed than the other areas. Therefore, 
Turkey as a whole is a unique context which will provide an interesting result and 
implication. Broadly, their paper tried to examine whether market participants incorporate 
new information into the estimation of stock value or investment decision or not. In other 
words, it tried to test the validity of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) which is similar 
to the work of Ismail and Suhardjo. However, this work focused on the stock market 
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reaction to only one extreme event so when compared with another literature it provides a 
more focused vision to the readers. 
In order to test the hypothesis that the drop in individual stock prices should be related to 
systematic risk of each stock (which is defined here as a rejection of bill), this systematic risk 
(or the betas of each stock) is estimated in this paper by using the well-known market 
model. Based on 60, 120, and 240 daily prices for 48 selected stocks listed in the Istanbul 
Stock Exchange (ISE) from February 20, 2002 to March 7, 2003, the market model is used in 
the form of ordinary least square regression where daily stock returns over a specific period 
are regressed on daily returns to the market index over that period and the systematic risk 
of that stock (beta). The results from all three regression indicated that systematic risks of 
stocks have statistically significant explanatory power for the percentage decline of stock 
prices regardless of time periods over which the betas are estimated. Moreover, negative 
slope coefficients implied that stocks with higher betas decreased more that those with 
lower betas. Thus, this finding verifies that investors are able to rationally reflect different 
systematic risk characteristics of stocks on the event day. 
Though it was found that market participants is rational in reflecting the new information in 
the value of securities, the overreact or underreact of stock prices to new coming 
information might be the case. Hence, in order to examine whether expected changes in 
value of stocks are less or more than true economic value, the paper calculated abnormal 
returns for each stock on the first day of event and on four subsequent days of week over 
which market direction was up. The result suggested that overall there is no strong sign for 
underreaction or overreaction of investors that violates the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
ĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞƌĞũĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŵŽƚŝŽŶ ?
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2.2) Response of Security Prices to Disasters 
In addition to the reaction of security prices to political risks, another remarkable issue 
which sparks an exploration by many scholars is the reaction of security prices to disasters 
(both man-made and natural). One of the latest and comprehensive works in this field was 
presented by Gunther and Laguna (2010) which examined the stock market reaction to 
industrial disasters using a sample of 64 explosions in 38 chemical plants and refineries 
worldwide over the period 1990-2005. Primarily, this paper investigated the equity returns 
losses following chemical disasters by means of a daily event study which measures the 
ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ŽĨ Ă ĚŝƐĂƐƚƌŽƵƐ ĞǀĞŶƚ Ăƚ ƚŝŵĞ ƚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ĂďŶŽƌŵĂů ƐƚŽĐŬƐ
returns (ARt) variable while the average loss incurred by shareholders is captured by the 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARt) up to a specific day after the accident. An 
expectation is that stock market value should decrease after an occurrence of the accident 
because of an uninsurable cost and a change in the belief of stakeholders and the investors 
ĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĨŝƌŵ ?ƐƐĂĨĞƚǇƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ?dŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ĨƌŽŵƐŚŽƌƚ-term evidence suggested that, on 
average, shareholders suffer a significant loss of 0.76% on the day of accident and 1.26% on 
the following day. Moreover, it was also found that thĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌ ?ƐƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŽƚŚĞĂĐĐŝĚĞŶƚƐ
tend to persist for a longer period as the cumulative returns after 20 days of the accident 
occurred are statistically significant at - ? ? ? ?A? ? &Žƌ ƚŚĞ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ŽĨ ĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ Ĩŝƌŵ ?Ɛ
market value, the result indicated that over two days the average decline in market value is 
equal to $306 million. 
In addition to the short-term evidence, cross-sectional and long-term evidence was also 
examine by investigating the relation of magnitude of losses and the seriousness of the 
accidents which, in the paper, are measured by the number of casualties and the occurrence 
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of toxic release. The results from this investigation are very interesting as it was found that 
the most serious incidents are associated with abnormal return losses of higher magnitude. 
Particularly, the CAARt within six months of events with fatalities and injuries are about 3% 
higher than the ones that did not cause human harm. Also, the CAARt of polluting incidents 
are about 7% higher than that of non-polluting incidents. Furthermore, the results also 
suggested that the response of investors to a serious accident is not complete in the short-
term and there is a possibility that the reaction will be more intensive in the long-term.  
Based on the fact that there might be additional factors which could be simultaneously 
ĂĨĨĞĐƚ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌ ?Ɛ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ƚŽ ĂĐĐŝĚĞŶƚƐ ? ŝŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ƐƚŽĐŬŵĂƌŬĞƚ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ
more deeply, the paper also tried to specify other determinants of the response by 
performing multivariate regressions where the numerous explanatory variables are included 
such as the total number of fatalities and serious injuries, a dummy set variable which equal 
to 1 if there is a toxic chemicals release, the number of previous chemical disasters 
experienced by the firm since 1980, the log of market value on the day before an accident, 
the abnormal media coverage received by each firm shortly before an accident, or the 
country dummy variables for accidents that happened in the UK, the continental Europe, 
Japan, and emerging countries.  
Short-term evidence from the regressions demonstrated that first, the human cost of an 
accident increases equity value losses, that is, one more fatality or serious injury leads to an 
additional market value loss of $164 million over three days after the accident date. Second, 
toxic chemical leakages do incur losses of greater magnitude where the difference in 
shareholders losses between toxic and non-toxic release case is $1 billion. Third, it was 
found that the higher number of previous accidents faced by the firms, the higher the 
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magnitude of loss in equity returns. Fourth, the results indicated that stock market losses 
are stronger in Japan and continental Europe compared to the US. Fifth, when compared to 
smaller firms, the data shown that bigger firms are less likely to be affected by accidents. 
^ŝǆƚŚ ? ŝƚ ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĂďŶŽƌŵĂů ůŽƐƐĞƐ ĂƌĞ ůŽǁĞƌ ĨŽƌ ĨŝƌŵƐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĂƌĞ ŝŶ ũŽƵƌŶĂůŝƐƚƐ ? ŵĂũŽƌ
concern in the period before disasters. For the long-ƚĞƌŵ ĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨ ĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌƐŽŶ ƚŚĞ Ĩŝƌŵ ?Ɛ 
value, it was found that the additional shareholders loss after six months associated with 
pollution occurrence is 12% and number of injuries and fatalities has no long-term effect on 
losses. Moreover, firms with bad environmental records lose their values more strongly 
than the firms with a good record and lastly, as observed in the short-term evidence, US 
firms incur lower losses than the firms in other countries. 
Javid (2007) examined the effect of the earthquake of October 8, 2005 which was viewed as 
one of the most severe geographical disaster in the region on the price behavior and 
activities of Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE), Pakistan. In particular, the objective of this study 
is to analyze the effects of this earthquake on stock market average return, volatility, and 
volume of the listed firms in KSE around the event date. The data used in the analysis 
contain three indicators including average return, volume, and volatility from 60 firms listed 
on KSE and the study is based on daily observations ranging from January 2005 to December 
2006. The methodology adopted for in this paper is the GARCH model however the model 
has been slightly modified by adding an impulse event dummy variable into the average 
stock returns and time-varying variance equation in order to separately capture the effects 
of the March-2005 market crash on stock market before the earthquake, the northern areas 
quake, and the post quake. Therefore, this dummy variable will take value zero before the 
earthquake, one from October 10, 2005 to October 30, 2005, and zero again afterward.  
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Interestingly, the results revealed that earthquake has both positive and negative 
information content for KSE stocks. The returns of banking and financial sectors experienced 
negative effect on average return but positive effect on the volume. The immediate positive 
reaction of investors appears in the cement, food, and chemical and pharmaceutical as 
there is a positive effect on the average returns and volume in these sectors while, in the 
textile sector, the situation is the same as a banking and financial sector. Therefore, these 
effects offset each other and the overall market did not show any dominated effect of this 
event. For the volatility, there is an increase in volatility but the results are not statistically 
significant in the case of most firms. One explanation given in the paper is that after the 
crash of March 2005, investors took a safe position so the earthquake did not affect the 
volatility much. Finally, the evidence suggested that the Pakistani stock market is reactive to 
unanticipated shocks and it takes no time to impact the market activities. Also, the stock 
market is resilient and it is capable of recovering soon after the disastrous event.  
Hill and Schneeweis (1983) conducted another research in a similar area with the above 
literatures however this work aimed to analyze the effect of disaster on a narrower scale, 
that is, it explored the impact of Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear accident only on the stock 
prices of electric utility sector. The data used in this paper is derived from a sample of 30 
non-nuclear and 34 nuclear utilities listed on New York Stock Exchange. The analysis of the 
reaction of utilities stock returns to the accident was conducted at three levels. First, the 
paper measured the risk-adjusted returns for the utility experiencing the nuclear accident, 
or General Public Utilities (GPU) which is a parent company of TMI, over monthly time 
periods surrounding TMI. Second, it performed the same analysis on an aggregate sample of 
ĞůĞĐƚƌŝĐƵƚŝůŝƚǇĨŝƌŵƐƚŽĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŵĂŐŶŝƚƵĚĞŽĨdD/ ?ƐŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶŽƚŚĞƌĨŝƌŵƐ
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in the industry. Lastly, it divided the sample into nuclear generating capacity utilities and 
non-nuclear generating capacity utilities in order to differentiate the impact of the nuclear 
accident between these utilities.  
Here, the risk-adjusted returns were calculated by using the single index market model 
where the returns will be estimated over the 36-month period February 1975  W February 
1978. Then, the monthly parameter will be used to calculate the abnormal returns (ARt) and 
the cumulative abnormal returns (CARt) of the three sub-samples: all utilities, nuclear 
utilities, and non-nuclear utilities. In addition to a single index market model, a two index 
model, in which the second index was defined as the monthly return on the S&P AAA long 
term industrial bond index, was also employed in order to eliminate the common influence 
of interest rate change from the abnormal returns. The results from the estimation 
indicated that on the month of an accident, the abnormal returns of GPU were negative and 
the returns decreased even more in the following month. This evidenced that the TMI has 
an adverse effect on GPU returns.  
For the effect of TMI on other utilitiĞƐ ? ƌĞƚƵƌŶƐ ? ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ dD/ ƐŚŽǁĞĚĂ ĐůĞĂƌĞĨĨĞĐƚ ŽŶ
GPU returns, the impact is not statistically significant on the utilities as a whole. When 
consider the sample in two sub-samples, it was found that abnormal returns of these two 
sub-samples are similar previous to TMI. However, on the month of the TMI and the 
following months, nuclear utilities have significantly negative abnormal returns while the 
abnormal returns in the non-nuclear utilities did not appear to be significantly negative. This 
result is confirmed even after removing interest rate effect as it was revealed from the two 
index market model estimation that the impact of accident on non-nuclear firms was less 
than that on nuclear based utilities.   
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Chance and Ferris (1987) also did a similar work in which the objective is to explore the 
reaction of the stock prices of the aircraft manufacture companies and the carriers to the 
aviation disasters. A very similar methodology with Hill and Schneeweis was used in their 
research to examine the impact of air crashes on air transport industry over the period 1962 
through 1985. Broadly, the paper measured the impact by investigating the average 
unexpected returns of the carriers and the aircraft manufacturers twenty days before and 
after the crashes occurred while the cumulative average expected returns are used to 
indicate the pattern in which a stock reacted to an event.  
The results from the air carrier tests suggested that there is a statistically significant 
negative return of the airline carriers which involved in the accidents on the event day. The 
1.2 percent of the average unexpected return implied that shareholders of the airlines 
involved in the accident incurred about 1.2 percent losses of wealth. Whereas, in the days 
after the event the t-statistics indicated that the market reaction to the crashes is 
immediate and not prolonged. When consider the movement of cumulative average 
expected returns, it was found that even though the market does not continue to react to 
the accident in the subsequent period, the cumulative average expected returns still not 
return to zero; therefore, the stock market reaction is quite substantial. However, when 
examining the results of crash on the average expected returns of the air carrier industry as 
a whole, the paper cannot find any evidence to support the assumption that investors 
viewed the air crashes as an industry-wide problem. 
For the investigation of the effect of air crashes on the stock returns of aircraft 
manufacturers, though the expectation is that there should be a negative reaction in the 
stocks of those companies due to potential liability, increased insurance rates, and more 
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costly safety standard incurred after the crashes, the empirical findings revealed that there 
is no significant impact on this sector at all. Therefore, it can be concluded that the stocks of 
the aircraft manufacturers exhibited no reaction to the crashes.   
2.3) Behavior of Securities Prices in the time of Market Crash  
Finally, a more specific topic which has been extensively explored by researchers in many 
areas is the behavior of security prices in responsive of a market crash. Schwert (1990) 
thoroughly examined the behavior of stock return and volatility around the 1987 market 
crash by using a sample of US stock return data from 1885 to 1988. Initially, he investigated 
the daily and monthly percentage change in stock return during the sample period and 
remarked that October 19, 1987, is the largest one-day percentage change in stock prices (-
20.4 percent). Also, he found several patterns of stock market behavior. First, the reversals 
emerged in many sub-periods; large drops in stock prices are frequently followed by large 
increases. For example, after the next two largest drops in stock prices on October 28 and 
29, the market rebounded on October 30 to 12.5 percent one-day gain which is the second 
largest gain in the sample. He noted that this is the characteristics of an increase in stock 
market volatility during and after the crash. The same conclusion was also drawn when 
using the monthly stock return data. 
Moreover, he also conducted a more structured analysis of the time-series properties of 
stock market volatility by employing an autoregressive and seasonal model to predict stock 
volatility. The model estimated short-term movements in conditional expected returns by 
regressed stock returns on 22 lagged returns and day-of-the-week dummy variable which 
captures differences in mean return in each-trading day. The similar model was also used to 
estimate the conditional standard deviation of returns. The results of the test from a stock 
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return model suggested that there is a weak tendency for movements in aggregate stock 
returns to persist and most of the movements in daily stock returns cannot be explained by 
ƚŚĞŵŽĚĞů ?ƐŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞnt variables. For the estimation of stock market volatility, the results 
showed that volatility is expected to be lower than average on Saturday since trading lasted 
only half day. Moreover, there is a strong tendency that the aggregate stock volatility will 
persist and movements in daily stock volatility are much more predictable than those in 
stock returns.  
A leverage effect in return-volatility relation was also examined in the paper by including 
lagged values of the volatility measure in the stock return estimation model. The model 
revealed that there is weak evidence that an increase in volatility increases the expected 
future return to stocks; rather, stock volatility is negatively related to stock return. More 
specifically, he found an asymmetric effect of a negative and positive return shock on stock 
volatility. That is, a negative shock has about 2.5 times as large an effect on volatility as a 
positive return shock. Finally, the paper compared and contrasted the behavior of stock 
volatility between the October 1987 crash and other market crashes by adding two sub-
period dummy variables including October and November 1987 and pointed out that there 
is an unusualness of the 1987 crash and its aftermath. First, it was found that during the 
October 1987 the stock returns are higher than predicted while they are lower than 
predicted in November 1987. Second, when comparing to the historical average, the stock 
market returned to relatively normal levels of volatility more quickly at the 1987 crash than 
previous crashes. These conclusions were confirmed even though the sample data are 
drawn from the options and futures markets. 
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With a similar fashion, Choudhry (1996) studied the stock market volatility, risk premia, and 
the persistence of volatility before and after the 1987 crash by using monthly stock indices 
from six emerging markets including Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Thailand and 
Zimbabwe. This research is conducted by means of the General Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity in the mean model (GARCH-M) which is capable of capturing the three 
striking features observed in stock return data: leptokurtosis, skewness, and volatility 
clustering. The whole period of this research starts from January 1976 to August 1994 
however the test divided this period into two sub-periods: pre- and post-1987 crash in order 
to examine the volatility, risk premia, and persistence of shocks to volatility in these sub-
periods.  
Using the GARCH (1,1)-M test, the results from the whole period (January 1976  W August 
1994) indicated that the ARCH effect is present in all six countries. In other words, there is 
an evidence of volatility clustering in the stock returns in all markets during this period 
although the shocks are not explosive. However, the test failed to find an evidence of a 
significant time-varying risk premium. Moreover, the residual kurtosis indicates that in all 
cases the residuals have thicker tails than a normal distribution and the largest kurtosis is 
found in the residuals from Mexico.  
When comparing the results from pre-crash and post-crash period, volatility clustering is 
presented in both periods only in the cases of Argentina, Greece, and India nevertheless it 
does not exist for Mexico and Thailand during the post-crash period (1987-94). The opposite 
is true for the case of Zimbabwe: no ARCH effect is found during the pre-crash period. For 
the effect of volatility on returns, there is no significant effect in any of the six cases during 
the pre-crash period however there is a significant effect during the post-crash period in the 
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cases of Argentina and India. When examining all six risk premium coefficients, the test 
failed to find any evidence about the trade-off between risk and the expected return in any 
country.  
Finally, the persistent measure or the sum of the coefficŝĞŶƚƐ  ?ɲA?ɴ ?ŽĨ'Z,ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů
variance equation (ht) for the whole period is insignificantly different from unity in the cases 
of Greece, India, Mexico, and Zimbabwe which indicates that shocks to volatility were 
permanent in these countries. Hence, stock prices of those four countries are affected by 
ƚŚĞǀŽůĂƚŝůŝƚǇŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?zĞƚ ?ƌŐĞŶƚŝŶĂ ?ƐĂŶĚdŚĂŝůĂŶĚ ?ƐƐƚŽĐŬŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?ƚŚĞǀŽůĂƚŝůŝƚǇŚĂƐĂŶ
insignificant impact on stock prices. Comparing the persistence measure between two sub-
periods, the persistence of shocks to volatility in Argentina and Zimbabwe seems to be 
permanent in both periods while the shocks are transitory in pre-crash period and 
permanent in post-crash period in Greece and India and the opposite is true in Mexico and 
Thailand. Overall, this paper found an evidence of changes in ARCH parameters, the risk 
premium, and volatility persistence before and after the 1987 crash in the stated markets, 
but the results are mixed and vary between the individual markets. 
Based on the fact that investors are currently facing integrated financial markets in which 
domestic and foreign securities are close substitute, Fang (2002) claimed that, according to 
the portfolio balance model (Branson and Henderson, 1985), currency depreciation should 
has negative effects on stock prices and stock returns. He then used a daily stock data from 
Thailand and the four other Asian Tigers; Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan to 
investigate this hypothesis over the period of Asian crisis 1997-1999 which caused a 
deƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ŵĂŶǇ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? ĐƵƌƌĞŶĐǇ ? dŚĞ ŵŽĚĞů ƵƐĞĚ ŝŶ ŚŝƐ ƉĂƉĞƌ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ŐĞŶĞƌĂůŝǌĞĚ
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity or GARCH (1,1) model in which the mean of 
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stock returns depend on its time-varying variance and the other causes for the mean or the 
changing variance. However, he modified the specification of the stock return process by 
including the depreciation rate as an additional regressor. Two hypotheses are set in this 
paper including; a) currency depreciation and its expectation will reduce the holdings of 
domestic stocks, switching to securities denominated in foreign currencies. Therefore, there 
will be decreases in demand and increases in the supply of domestic stock market, resulting 
in a fall in stock prices and returns and b) since, in the Asian crisis, it is unavoidable for the 
risk-averse investors to encountered unstable financial markets, they preferred to hold a 
stronger currency such as dollar to lower risk. The switch between assets of stocks and the 
dollar amplified fluctuations of the stock market. In other words, domestic currency 
depreciation due to the financial crisis could be a cause of stock market volatility.  
The results showed that there is high volatility persistence in all markets where South Korea 
presented the highest persistence followed by Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
Moreover, two important conclusions from the research are drawn. First, a significant 
negative relation between the stock return and the depreciation rate existed in the stock 
market of Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. For Hong Kong, though the stock 
market did not exhibit this relation due to no change in an exchange rate, the concern about 
the depreciation hit the stock market harshly. The same situation occurred as well in 
Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand which suggested that currency depreciation rooted from 
the Asian crisis is a source of market volatility. However, the depreciation has an adverse 
ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ŽŶ ^ŽƵƚŚ <ŽƌĞĂ ?Ɛ ƐƚŽĐŬ ƌĞƚƵƌŶƐ ďƵƚ ŶŽƚ ŽŶ ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ǀŽůĂƚŝůŝƚǇ ?Second, he found an 
evidence that currency depreciation which caused by the crisis is a determinant of stock 
market volatility. As the end of his paper, he provided the implication from the research that 
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domestic investors or international fund managers who intend to invest in East Asian newly 
emerging stock markets may need to carefully evaluate the stability of the foreign exchange 
markets to avoid biased judgment.  
A more detailed work which contemplated on the behavior of a specific stock in the 
turbulent period was conducted by Glascock et al. (2004). This work was inspired by the 
general believe that, the Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) shares provide an 
opportunity to invest in diversified portfolios of real estate properties in a similar degree of 
liquidity with other publicly traded shares or a much greater liquidity comparing to a direct 
ownership of real property. In addition, REITs shares also possess a defensive characteristic 
as they provide inflation hedging benefits to the investors. The implication of these 
characteristics is that REITs stocks should behave differently than the overall stock market 
during periods of high market volatility. Hence, the paper aimed to examine the returns of 
REIT and non-REIT common stocks around the October 1997 market decline based on the 
assumption that REIT stocks should experience a lesser price decrease than the overall 
market. 
Using the stock data from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Trades and Quotes (TAQ) 
database and the 1997 REIT Handbook from October 24 to October 28, 1997, the hypothesis 
was tested by observing the width of the bid-ask price spread of the REITs stocks compared 
to other stocks before, during, and after the market decline. The October 27 close-to-close 
returns data indicated that REITs decreased by approximately half the magnitude of non-
REIT stocks. However, the fall in returns in REITs is as pervasive as the non-REIT stocks as the 
percentage of the stocks that showed a decline in REITs and non-REIT stocks is quite similar 
(94.5 and 93.5 percent, respectively). On October 28, the close-to-close returns differ 
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between REITs and non-REIT stock. The returns on that day are approximately five times 
larger for the non-REITs than the REITs and the percentage of stocks with positive returns is 
also larger. Overall, the results indicated that REITs seems to behave differently than 
common stocks in terms of the magnitude of the returns and the reversals. That is, REITs 
have smaller returns on the day of the market decline and less of a reversal on the day 
following the decline. Therefore, it was concluded in this paper that REIT stocks act as a 
defensive stock because they exhibit less variation in returns and bid-ask spread behavior. 
Additionally, the paper also investigated whether or not the riskiness of REITs (as measured 
by the standard deviation) can be a proper explanation for the difference in returns of the 
REITs and non-REITs. The behavior of the risk measure is examined by calculating the 
standard deviation during the period before the market decline (1-22 October, 1997) and 
then testing its significance in explaining the cross-section of returns on and after the 
market decline. The result revealed that the standard deviation is not a good risk measure 
for the REITs. This result is also confirmed by the regressions of an REIT/non-REIT indicator 
variable, the standard deviation risk measure, a utility indicator variable, and the dividend 
yield as all coefficients are statistically significant indicating that there is a difference in REIT 
returns that cannot be fully explained only by differences in standard deviation.  
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Chapter III - Summary of major political 
events in Thailand 
Before going through to the remaining parts of this dissertation, it is useful to provide some 
backgrounds of Thai politics especially during the study period in order to provide the 
ƌĞĂĚĞƌƐƐŽŵĞ ŝĚĞĂƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŬĞǇĞǀĞŶƚƐǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞ ůŝŬĞůǇƚŽ ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ?ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?
Literally, Thailand is now being governed by a democratic government however it is widely 
ŬŶŽǁŶƚŚĂƚ ? ŝŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ŝƐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵŶĂŵĞůǇ  ‘ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů
ŵŽŶĂƌĐŚǇ ? ? dŚŝƐ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐ ŽĨ Ă ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ŝŶ ĂĐĐŽƌĚĂŶĐĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ
constitution while acknowledges a hereditary or elected monarch as head of the state. In 
fact, as Kobkua (2003) claimed, a form of constitutional monarchy in Thailand is a traditional 
ǀĞƌƐŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌĞƐƚŚĞĞǆƚƌĂ-ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůƉŽǁĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞƚŚƌŽŶĞ ? ?ƚ
some degree, the constitution was regarded as a pre-emptive measure to protect the 
monarchy (McCargo, 2005). When incorporated with the influence of politicians, 
bureaucracy, noble men, academicians, or tycoons, Thai politics is thus propelled by these 
groups of people which share mutual benefits. So it is not surƉƌŝƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ
political situation is extremely complicated and frequently exhibits conflicts within and 
between the groups of people.  
 ?Ǥ ?Ȍǯ 
First of all, I would like to begin this section with a brief presentation of important political 
events in Thailand over the 21st century as exhibited in the timeline below (figure 2). 
Beginning on January 2000 where tycoon Thaksin Shinawatra, the leader of  ‘dŚĂŝƐ ůŽǀĞ
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dŚĂŝƐ ?  ?dZd ? party, was nominated for the first time as the 23rd Prime Minister. He has 
gained a lot of nation-wide popularity over his session, this is said to be because of his 
distinguishing policies such as low-interest agricultural loan, village-managed microcredit 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĨƵŶĚƐ ? ‘ ? ?ďĂŚƚĐƵƌĞĂůůĚŝƐĞĂƐĞ ?ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ?ŽŶĞĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚ-one  
Figure 2 Timeline of key political events in Thailand 
Sources: Timelines SDB (2010), Horrocks (2010), Poyzner (2010) 
͚ϭϬ 
͚08 
͚09 
͚06 
͚07 
͚01 
͚02 
͚03 
͚04 
͚05 
January 6 Thaksin won the election and became a Prime Minister 
August 3 The Court dismissed a corruption case against Thaksin 
July 8 The beginning of a continuous violence by the separatists in southern Thailand 
March 28 Thai government announce that the violence in the South is at a crucial-stage 
February 6 Thaksin was in charge of his second term as a PM 
April 3 Thaksin claimed a win in general election 
March 5 Thousand rallied against PM 
September 19 Coup leaded by army chief while PM is away 
December 23 dŚĂŬƐŝŶ ?ƐĂůůŝĞƐǁŽŶƚŚĞĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ 
June 2 Protesters demanded the PM (Samak) to resign 
December 15 Abhisit was elected as a new PM in a parliamentary vote 
April 13 Anti-government protesters started to be under control 
April 7 Declaration of a state of emergency in Bangkok 
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product, or the declaration of drug and AIDS war. All of which appeals the majority of 
people iŶƚŚĞƌƵƌĂůĂƌĞĂĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞƐĞƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐĂƌĞĂůƐŽŬŶŽǁŶĂƐ  ‘ƉŽƉƵůŝƐŵ ?ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ
that were subsequently criticized by technocrats about its long-term effects on the country 
people. Despite of his popularity, during the period being a PM, his government was 
accused of a policy corruption but the case was acquitted by the court soon after. 
Moreover, he was also verbally attacked by the opponents in supporting or providing a 
benefit to his relatives or intimates, such as encouraging the designation Police General 
 ‘ŚĂŝƐŝƚ ^ŚŝŶĂǁĂƚƌĂ ? ƚŽ ďĞ ŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌ-in-Chief or reducing concessions tax to AIS 
corporation which is owned by the brother of his wife, Khunying Pojaman Shinawatra, by 
using his political power.  
3.2) Separatism in the Southern part of the country  
OŶĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇ ĐƌƵĐŝĂů ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĞǀĞŶƚƐ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ WD dŚĂŬƐŝŶ ?Ɛ ƉĞƌŝŽĚ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚĞŶĚƐ ƚŽ
affect the stability of the country in view of investors is the discomposure around the 
Southern area of the country in Narathiwas, Pattani, Yala, and 4 main districts in Songkhla 
province which leads to many aggressive actions such as the ambuscade, arson, terrorism, 
and riot by some groups of Muslim people so-called separatists. This problem stems from 
ƚŚĞďĞůŝĞǀĞŽĨƐŽŵĞDƵƐůŝŵƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉůĂŶƚŽƌĞĨŽƌŵƚŚĞ education system of 
the whole country is aimed to integrate all Malaysian Muslim with a power hub in Bangkok 
which is regarded as a challenge to traditional Muslim believe and identity. Consequently, 
they raised the issues about the difference in nationality and religion and the political 
unfairness as an excuse to separate themselves from the mainland (Dorairajoo, 2006). 
During that time, the majority of Thai people and the government did not agree with this 
excuse and tried to negotiate with the separatists in order to maintain the unity of the 
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whole country. Unfortunately, those Muslim people asserted the request for their freedom 
and employed a more violent means to force the government in providing them 
independence. Until now, their actions resulted in many deaths and injuries of teachers, 
children, monks, army, and even another group of Muslims who disagree with the isolation. 
Though the government has attempted to employ various strategies to put an end to the 
violence such as declaring the state of emergency, setting up a 24/7 surveillance by the 
army in all dangerous area or even declaring to use a more firm and aggressive means to 
stop all separatists, the violence still proceeds up till now without any sign of a termination.  
3.3) Declaration of Tǯ  
After 4 years as a Prime Minister, Thaksin was second elected on April 3rd, 2006 with a 
recorded-breaking 19 million votes  W overwhelmingly won the  ‘ĞŵŽĐƌĂƚ WĂƌƚǇ ? currently 
leaded by  ‘ďŚŝƐŝƚ sĞũũĂũŝǀĂ ? - in spite of the criticism by the antagonists about his 
 ‘dŚĂŬƐŝŶŽŵŝĐƐ ?system (which focused on government spending and supporting the 
livelihood of the people in a lower and intermediate social classes which also known as 
 ‘'ƌĂƐƐƌŽŽƚƐ ? citizen), corruption, and vote-buying issues at that time. The result of this 
reelection was considered as a starting point of the series of a conflict between the anti- 
and pro-government people which persists until now (Pornwalai, 2004). When talking about 
the fight among these two groups, the name  ‘^ŽŶĚŚŝ>ŝŵƚŚŽŶŐŬƵů ? should not be missed in 
this topic. Sondhi has ever supporting Thaksin during the first session as a PM however he 
later changed to the opposite position due to some business conflicts which resulted in the 
cancellation of his weekly TV show broadcasted on government-run TV channel. Due to the 
discontent, he then set up weekly rallies and established a group named  ‘WĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐůůŝĂŶĐĞ
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ĨŽƌ ĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ?  ?W ? or the  ‘ǇĞůůŽǁ-ƐŚŝƌƚ ?to uncover the fresh allegations of official 
corruption and misconduct.  
Another point which sparked the dissatisfaction of the PAD group is the selling of all stocks 
of Shin Corporation Plc, which owned by the Shinawatra and Damapong family, to Temasek 
,ŽůĚŝŶŐƐ ? dŚŝƐ ĐĂƐĞ ǁĂƐ ŝŶ ƉƵďůŝĐ ?Ɛ ĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ĚƵĞ ƚŽƚŚĞ ŽǀĞƌůĂƉƉŝŶŐ interests and the 
evasion of a relevant tax incurred from this transaction. When combining these two main 
causes together, the result is the frequent rallies by the PAD in order to pressure and call for 
ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐŝŐŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ dŚĂŬƐŝŶ ?Ɛ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? hŶƚŝů &ĞďƌƵĂry 4, 2006, Prime Minister Thaksin 
decided to dissolve the parliament and called for a snap election on April 2, 2006. During 
that time, the demonstration became more serious as it spread into Bangkok and the main 
shopping area which disrupted business and traffic in the heart of the capital. On April 3, 
2006, the result of a general election which followed weeks of anti-government protests 
revealed that Thais love Thais party again won more than half of the vote thus Prime 
Minister Thaksin has rights to stay in his position. Then again, the PAD did not satisfy with 
this poll and kept on with the protests purposed to oust Thaksin from his position.  
 ?Ǥ ?Ȍ ? ? ? ?ǯ 
The situation getting worse till September 19, 2006, one of the most important day in 
dŚĂŝůĂŶĚ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŚŝƐƚŽƌǇǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞĂƌŵǇĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌ ?'ĞŶĞƌĂů  ‘^ŽŶƚŚŝŽŽŶǇĂƌĂƚŬĂůŝŶ ?, in 
the name of Council for National Security (CNS), launched a bloodless coup against Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra by seizing control of TV stations and declaring a provisional 
authority pledging loyalty to the king. It was the 18th coup in Thailand since 1932 and 
General  ‘WƌĞŵ dŝŶƐƵůĂŶŽŶĚĂ ?, one of the most influential persons in Thai politics, was 
suspected to be the mastermind of the coup. At that time, Gen. Sonthi claimed that this 
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coup was aimed to bring peace back to the country and he promised to give democracy 
back to all Thais as soon as possible also he planned to hold an election by October 2007. As 
a result of this coup, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was thus automatically dismissed 
from his position and General  ‘^ƵƌĂǇƵĚ ŚƵůĂŶŽŶƚ ? was appointed as an interim Prime 
Minister by the CNS. This undemocratic action invoked a lot of criticisms and provoked 
another group of people in the country who later called themselves as  ‘hŶŝƚĞĚ ĨƌŽŶƚ ĨŽƌ
ĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ŝĐƚĂƚŽƌƐŚŝƉ ?  ?h ? or the  ‘ƌĞĚ-ƐŚŝƌƚ ?. Generally, the objectives of the 
UDD are to request for a democratic government and an amnesty for the previous Prime 
Minister so that he has rights to come back to the country again.  
During the period following the coup, one topic which was informally commented in the 
country is the attempt of the government to intervene both local and national media. It was 
said that a large number of regional and nation-wide radio and TV stations were closed due 
ƚŽƚŚĞŝƌŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐǁŚŝĐŚĐĂƐƚƐĚŽƵďƚŽŶƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?ŵĂŶǇǁĞďƐŝƚĞƐ
which seems to disagree with the government were also cancelled without any set limit. 
This interference on the media has even cause more dissatisfactory among the red-shirt 
protesters as the action was considered as the intention to distort the truth and made the 
information unavailable. However, as pledged by Gen. Sonthi, Gen. Surayud later resigned 
from being an interim Prime Minister and the parliamentary election has been conducted 
on January 29, 2008. The voting result appeared that  ‘^ĂŵĂŬ^ƵŶĚĂƌĂǀĞũ ?, representing the 
ex-PM Thaksin Shinawatra interests, was chosen by the parliament as a new Prime Minister. 
However, his office as a Prime Minister continued just over a short period as he was forced 
to resign after the court ruled that he violated the law by hosting a cooking TV program. The 
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ruling party then nominated  ‘^ŽŵĐŚĂŝ tŽŶŐƐĂǁĂƚ ?, brother-in-law of the ousted PM 
Thaksin, to be a new Prime Minister on September 17, 2008.  
3.5) The situation getting more serious 
Again, the anti-government protesters (PAD) unpleased with the nomination of PM Somchai 
and almost thousand of the members gathered for their big rally in front of the parliament 
ĂŶĚĐůŽƐĞĚƚŚĞĐĂƉŝƚĂů ?ƐŵĂŝŶĂŝƌƉŽƌƚ ?‘^ƵǀĂƌŶĂďŚƵŵŝ ?, in order to put more pressure on PM 
Somchai to resign from his position. After weeks of protests, PM Somchai then ruled by the 
court to resign while parliament will have to choose a new Prime Minister within 30 days. 
Finally, on December 15, 2008, in a parliamentary vote, Abhisit Vejjajiva was elected to be a 
Prime Minister amidst the hope that he will bring tranquility to the country again.  
Unfortunately, the situation is contrast to what expected. The red-shirt protesters resumed 
their demonstrations with the reason that PM Abhisit did not acquired his position by a 
transparent means but this time they declared to fight for democracy till the end of their 
life. Almost a million oĨ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ƚŚƵƐ ƐĞŝǌĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĂƌĞĂ ŝŶ  ‘^ĂŶĂŵ >ƵĂŶŐ ? ? ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ?Ɛ ďŝŐŐĞƐƚ
ƐƋƵĂƌĞ ?ĂƐƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŵŵĂŶĚŝŶŐĐĞŶƚƌĞƚŽĐĂůůĨŽƌWDďŚŝƐŝƚ ?ƐƌĞƐŝŐŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞƐƚĂƌƚŝŶŐƉŽŝŶƚŽĨ
the most violent political event in the history occurred when the UDD protestors declare to 
use a shrapnel strategy by dispersing the rally into all important places in Bangkok. As a 
solution, the government then commanded the army and police to dissolve the 
demonstration which led to an extremely harsh battle between the army and the protestors 
as presented by worldwide press agencies. The direct costs of this action are almost 
hundred deaths and innumerable injuries. However, the indirect cost of this battle is the 
damage to the constructions in many areas, the loss from an inability to do some business 
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ƚƌĂŶƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƚƵƌŵŽŝů ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞůŽƐƐŝŶŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ?ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞĂƐdŚĂŝůĂŶĚ ŝƐǀŝĞǁĞĚ
as a highly unstable country for the investment. 
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Chapter IV - Data & Methodology 
4.1) Stocks and news data 
In order to explore the reaction of stock market movement on political risks, I will use the 
SET index as a representative of the overall stock prices trading on the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand. Here, the historical daily data of the SET index are obtained from Siam Commercial 
ĂŶŬ ?Ɛ ?^ ? website. The SET index is a composite index representing the price movement 
of all common stocks trading on the main board where the stock closing prices are used to 
calculate the index. It is a market capitalization-weighted price index and the calculation of 
the index is adjusted in line with modifications in the value of stocks resulting from changes 
in the number of stocks owing to various events such as conversions of preferred to 
common shares or exercised warrants. Therefore, all effects other than price movements 
were eliminated from the index. This will help increase the accuracy of the results 
implication as the irrelevant external factors are excluded from the data. 
For the news data, the daily political news is obtained from the website of Bangkok Post, 
one of the most famous Thai bi-language newspapers which is known by both domestic and 
international investors. Only the headline news are selected for the analysis where the key 
ǁŽƌĚƐ ƵƐĞĚ ŝŶ ƐĞĂƌĐŚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŶĞǁƐ ŽŶůŝŶĞ ĂƌĞ  ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?  ‘dŚĂŬƐŝŶ ? ?  ‘ďŚŝƐŝƚ ? ?  ‘ŽƵƉ ? ?  ‘h ? ?
 ‘W ? ?  ‘ƌĂůůǇ ? ?  ‘ƉƌŽƚĞƐƚ ? ?  ‘ƐŽƵƚŚĞƌŶ ?ĂŶĚ  ‘ĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? /ŶĨĂĐƚ ?ƚŚĞƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŬĞǇǁŽƌĚƐĂŶĚ
news to be included in the data set is quite subjective. For the key words, I try to choose the 
set of words that can cover all important political events in Thailand as reviewed in last 
section as much as possible. The search results provide approximately 5,000 news which I 
believe that almost all of the required major political news have been included in the results 
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though some key words might not be entered in the searching procedure. Another problem 
I encountered in the news data collection process is the occasional difficulty in deciding 
whether to take some news into the data set or not. For example, the headline  “W ƚŽ
close five ĂŝƌƉŽƌƚƐ ŝŶWDƉƌŽƚĞƐƚ ? (September 29, 2008) might clearly indicate the political 
instability in the country however the headline  “dŚĂŬƐŝŶ ?ƐůĂǁƐƵŝƚƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚ ? (September 27, 
2008) is not. To solve the problem, one criterion I used is that the news to be selected will 
be the one that indicates a political instability of the country and affects investment 
decision. Political news which is not obviously shown the instability and not related to 
ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŵĂŬŝŶŐǁŝůů ŶŽƚďĞ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ in order to minimize any 
ambiguity that might occur in the analysis. Therefore, in the above case the latter headline 
will not be included in the data set. 
The study period for this research starts from January 1, 2004 to October 1, 2008. This 
period is divided into two sub-periods which are 1) January 1, 2004 to September 19, 2006 
and 2) September 20, 2006 to October 1, 2008. Since one of the objectives of the research is 
to explore the difference of political news impact on stock market before and after the 
coup, the cut-off date is the day in which the coup took place.  
4.2) Hypotheses and methodology 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the main objective of this dissertation is to study 
whether or not stock market volatility in Thailand is changed by the release of political news 
regarding the important political events. Additionally, this study also aims to investigate the 
amplification effect of the latest coup on the impact of political news on stock market 
movement. Generally, coup is regarded as one of the signals of political risks or instability in 
the country as stated in many academic literatures especially in the international business 
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area, for example,  “ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƌŝƐŬƐ ĂƌŝƐĞ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ǁŚŝĐŚ
interfere with or prevent business transactions, or change the terms of agreements, or cause 
ƚŚĞĐŽŶĨŝƐĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŚŽůůǇŽƌƉĂƌƚŝĂůůǇĨŽƌĞŝŐŶŽǁŶĞĚďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ? (Weston and Sorge 
1972, p.60). Therefore, it is believed that, to some extent, this military action may reduce 
ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ? ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞ ƚŽ ŝŶǀĞƐƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ĂŶĚ ŝŶƚĞŶƐŝĨǇ ƚŚĞ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ŽĨ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƌŝƐŬƐ ŽŶ
stock market volatility. The evidence which apparently demonstrate the influence of coup 
ŽŶƚŚĞĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞŽĨŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐĂďŽƵƚĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƌŝƐŬŝƐŐŝǀĞŶby McGeown (2007), in his 
ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ ŽĨ dŚĂŝůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ?ĐŽƵƉ ŽŶ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ? ǀŝĞǁƉŽŝŶƚ
published in BBC news, he stated that  “ ?ƚ ?ŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ ŝŶĐŝĚĞŶĐĞƚŽŚŝƚ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌ ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞǁĂƐ
ƚŚĞĐŽƵƉŝƚƐĞůĨ ? ?These assumptions leads to four interesting hypotheses to be tested which 
are: 
H1: There is a difference in stock market volatility between the day at which political news 
(event day) was released and the day at which there is no major political news (non-event 
day).  
H2: The difference in stock market volatility between the event and non-event day is higher 
after the coup. 
H3: Major political news has a significant impact on both stock market returns and volatility. 
H4: The impact of major political news on stock market returns and volatility was amplified 
after the coup incident. 
In order to test the first two hypotheses of the equality of stock market volatilities between 
event and non-event day, I choose to apply the Mann-Whitney test which is a 
nonparametric test instead of a parametric test such as the t-test or the variance-ratio test 
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which has an underlying assumption about the normality of the population distribution. 
Before testing the hypotheses, the first step is to calculate stock returns and volatility across 
two trading days. For the stock returns, I employed a traditional calculation of a natural 
logarithmic return, that is, stock returns in period t (Rt) is equal to ln(Pt/Pt-1) where Pt is a 
stock price in period t. For the stock volatility, we will use a stock volatility data estimated by 
a statistical package in which this estimation will be based on the concept of a GARCH 
model. This method will provide a more reliable volatility data than calculating volatility by 
traditional means of squaring the stock returns.  
Next, to investigate the effect of political news in Thailand on stock returns and volatilities, I 
use the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity in Mean (GARCH-M) of 
Engle, Lilien and Roberts (1987) as a main model to estimate stock mean returns and 
volatility. The GARCH model is used in this case since, according to Choudhry (1996), it is 
capable of capturing the three most empirical features observed in our stock return data 
which are leptokurtosis, skewness, and volatility clustering as will be shown later in the 
preliminary analysis section. Before going through to the specification of the GARCH-M 
model, it is useful to discuss about where this model comes from. The root of the GARCH-M 
model is the autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) model proposed in the 
seminal paper by Engle (1982). The concept of the ARCH model is that the variance of the 
error term at time t can be explained by the squared error terms from previous periods. The 
simplest specification of this model is 
ߪ௧ଶ ؠ ܧሼ݁௧ଶȁ߶௧ିଵሽ ൌ ߱ ൅ ߙ݁௧ିଵଶ  
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Where ߶௧ିଵ represents the information set in previous period, normally including ߝ௧ିଵ and 
its entire history (Verbeek, 2004). This is an ARCH(1) process with an implication that when 
a big shock happens in period t-1, it is more likely that the variance of ߝ௧ is also large.  
ARCH models have been generalized in many different ways and the most well-known one is 
introduced by Bollerslev (1986) namely the generalized ARCH or GARCH model. The 
advantage of the GARCH model is that it incorporates heteroscedasticity into the estimation 
procedure. The GARCH (p,q) model can be thought as a reduced form of a more 
complicated dynamic structure for the time varying conditional second order moments, 
according to Bollerslev et al. (1992). The general form of the GARCH (1,1) model can be 
written as 
ߪ௧ଶ ൌ ߱ ൅ ߙ݁௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߚߪ௧ିଵଶ  
which has only three unknown parameters. This model estimates the variance of return on 
day t as a weighted average of a constant, the forecast of previous day, and the previous 
ĚĂǇ ?ƐƐƋƵĂƌĞĚĞƌƌŽƌ ?
The standard GARCH model is widely known as a convenient way for forecasting volatility, 
nonetheless, one important restriction of this model is the symmetry, that is, it assumes 
that a big negative shock will exert an equivalent impact on volatility to a big positive shock. 
Unfortunately, in practice, the impact is asymmetric: an unanticipated bad news usually 
leads to a larger impact on future volatility than an unexpected good news. To capture this 
ĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌǇ ?EĞůƐŽŶ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂĚũƵƐƚĞĚĂŐĞŶĞƌĂů'Z,ŵŽĚĞů ŝŶƚŽĂŶĞǁĂƉproach known 
as an exponential GARCH or EGARCH model which can be specified by 
݈݋݃ߪ௧ଶ ൌ ߱ ൅ ߚ݈݋݃ߪ௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߛ ݁௧ିଵߪ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙ ȁ݁௧ିଵȁߪ௧ିଵ  
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The term ߝ௧ିଵ/ ߪ௧ିଵ is included here in order to capture the asymmetric effect. When ߛ < 0, 
it means that volatility responds to positive shocks less than negative shocks while  ߛ > 0 
implies that positive shocks generate more volatility than negative shocks. 
An alternative way to capture the asymmetric effect is proposed by Ding, Granger, and 
Engle (1993) namely asymmetric power arch (APARCH) model. The specification of the 
conditional variance of this model is: 
ߪ௧ఋ ൌ ߱ ൅෍ߙ௜௤௜ୀଵ ሺȁ݁௧ି௜ȁ െ ߛ݁௧ି௜ሻఋ ൅෍ߚ௜௤௜ୀଵ ߪ௧ି௜ఋ  
This model parameterizes the conditional standard deviation raised to the power of ߜ as a 
function of the lagged conditional standard deviation and the difference between absolute 
and the value of lagged innovations raised to the same power (Bollerslev, 2008). In this 
model, the coefficient ߛ ĐĂƉƚƵƌĞƐĂ ‘ůĞǀĞƌĂŐĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨƚŚĞŶĞǁƐ ? ?dǇƉŝĐĂůůǇ ?ߛ is found to be 
positive so that the volatilities increase more following negative than positive news.  
Whereas, ߜ  ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘dĂǇůŽƌ ĨĨĞĐƚ ?  ?^ƚĂƐƚŶǇ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞ ƐĂŵƉůĞ
autocorrelations of absolute returns are usually larger than those of squared returns. This 
effect was observed by Taylor (1986) and Ding et al. (1993) and so-ĐĂůůĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ůŽŶŐŵĞŵŽƌǇ
ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ? ? ƌŽĂĚůǇ ƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐ ? ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌߜ tells us the long memory of stock market 
volatility (MBS, 2004). 
Finally, we will go into more details about the GARCH-M model which is a main model of 
this study, this model comes from the financial idea which says that certain sources of risk 
are priced by the market. In other words, assets with more risks may provide higher average 
returns to compensate for that risk. The model extends the conventional GARCH model by 
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allowing the conditional mean to depend directly on the conditional variance (Bollerslev, 
2008). Typically, a traditional GARCH-M model can be specified as 
ܴ௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵߪ௧ଶ ൅ ݁௧ 
where ߪ௧ଶ|߶௧ିଵ ?ܰሺ݋ǡ ߪ௧ଶሻ and ߪ௧ଶ ൌܾ଴ ൅ ܾଵ݁௧ିଵ ൅ ܾଶߪ௧ିଵଶ  
where ܴ௧  is the return of the stock market index in period t and again ߶௧ିଵis the set of all 
information available in previous period while ݁௧ is the error term which is distributed as 
conditionally normal with time-varying variance ߪ௧ଶ. The non-negativity property of ߪ௧ଶ 
implies that ܾ଴ ൐  ?, ܾଵǡ ܾଶ ൐  ?, and ܾଵ ൅ ܾଶ ൏  ?. The GARCH-M model provides a more 
flexible approach to capture various dynamic structures of conditional variance and it allows 
simultaneous estimation of parameters of interest and hypotheses (Chou, 1988). In the 
above equation, the presence of conditional variance (ߪ௧ଶ) in the mean returns equation 
gives a way to directly investigate the tradeoff between risk and return. The coefficient of 
this parameter (ܽଵ) captures the significant influence of volatility on stock returns. A 
positively significant coefficient ܽଵ implies that stock investors were compensated with 
higher returns for bearing higher levels of risk. On the other hands, a negatively significant ܽଵ indicates that investors were penalized for bearing risk.  
For the lagged error term (݁௧ିଵ) in the conditional variance equation, the size and 
significance of the coefficient ܾଵ indicates the magnitude of the effect imposed by ݁௧ିଵ on 
conditional variance (ߪ௧). In particular, it implies the existence of the ARCH process in the 
error term or volatility clustering. Note that volatility clustering in stock returns means that 
small (large) changes in price will follow a small (large) price changes of either signs. As 
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stated by Bollerslev et al. (1992, p.32) and other empirical works, the ARCH effect might be 
owing to nominal interest rates, clustering of trade volumes, dividend yields, oil price index, 
etc.  
The concept of this model fits well with the research context of this dissertation as we want 
to explore the impact of political risk on stock prices. The utilization of GARCH (p,q)-M 
model in examining stock volatility is also advocated by Engle (1990). However, I would like 
to apply some modification to the model in order to capture the effect of political risks more 
extensively. Here, the assumptions behind this modified model are 1) favorable political 
news will cause a positive impact to stock returns and volatility whereas unfavorable 
political news will cause a negative impact 2) the two different types of news would induce 
different amount of additional volatility to the stocks. In other words, the effect of political 
risks on stock returns and volatility is asymmetric and 3) the happening of 2006-coup has 
affected both the mean return and volatility of the stock market. Regarding to these 
assumptions, we can derive the modified GARCH (1,1)-M model as follow 
ܴ௧ ൌ ܽ଴ ൅ ܽଵ݄௧ ൅ ܽଶܴ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଷܦܥ ൅ ߙସܦܩ ൅ ߙହܦܩ ൈ ܦܥ ൅ ܾଵܦܤ ൅ ܾଶܦܤ ൈ ܦܥ ൅ ݁௧     (1) 
݄௧ ൌ ܿ଴ ൅ ܿଵ݁௧ିଵ ൅ ܿଶ݄௧ିଵ ൅ ܿଷܦܥ ൅ ܿସܦܩ ൅ ܿହܦܩ ൈ ܦܥ ൅ ݀ଵܦܤ ൅ ݀ଶܦܤ ൈ ܦܥ      (2) 
The above equations indicate that this is a GARCH (1,1)-in-mean model since we have 
included a one-period lagged error and variance terms into the current conditional time-
varying variance equation. From equation (1) and (2), five dummy variables were added to 
the model. First is a favorable news dummy (DG) which will equal to 1 if there is a good 
political news and zero otherwise. Second is an unfavorable news dummy (DB) which will 
equal to 1 if there is a bad political news and zero otherwise. Third is a coup dummy (DC) 
which will equal to zero on the pre-coup period (January 1, 2004 to September 19, 2006) 
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and one on the post-coup period (September 20, 2006 to October 1, 2008). Fourth and fifth 
are the interacted dummy variables (ܦܩ ൈ ܦܥ and ܦܤ ൈ ܦܥ) between good/bad news and 
coup. These two variables will be used to investigate whether coup has amplified the effect 
of news on stock returns and volatility or not. The rationale of this model is to distinguish 
the impact of different types of news on returns while capturing the effects on volatility at 
the same time. The sign and amount of the coefficients ܽସ and ܾଵ of the DG and DB dummy 
variables in equation (1) tell the direction and magnitude of the impact of favorable and 
unfavorable news on stock returns, respectively. Likewise, the coefficients ܿଷ and ݀ଵ in 
equation (2) indicate the direction and magnitude of the release of political news on stock 
volatility. Whereas, the coefficients of the interacted dummy variables in both equation (i.e., ܽହ, ܾଶ, ܿସ, and ݀ଶ) explain whether or not the coup has amplified impact of political news on 
stock returns and volatility. 
Other than focusing on the effect of political news on SET index returns and volatility, this 
dissertation also aims to examine the persistence of this effect as well. According to Engle 
and Bollerslev (1986), if the sum of the coefficients of the lagged variance and lagged error 
term (ܿଵ ൅ ܿଶ for our model) in a GARCH (1,1)-M model equals to one, it means a) 
persistence of a forecast of the conditional variance over all finite horizons b) an infinite 
variance for the unconditional distribution of ݁௧. That is, when ܿଵ ൅ ܿଶ ൌ  ? a current shock 
persists indefinitely in conditioning the future variance and the more the sum of ܿଵ and ܿଶ 
approaches unity, the greater the persistence of shocks to volatility. A value higher than 
unity indicates that the response of volatility to shock increases with time and a value lower 
than unity implies that shocks decay with time. The closer to unity, the slower the decay 
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rate (Chou, 1988).Therefore, the value of ܿଵ ൅ ܿଶ will be used as a measure to investigate 
the persistence of political news on stock market volatility.  
4.3) Preliminary data analysis 
This section provides a preliminary analysis of the stock index data over the study period. 
This initial analysis will be a primary step that helps confirm the appropriateness of the 
model used to explore the relationship between stock market volatility and political risks. 
Therefore, it is regarded as a useful step of the research.  
4.3.1) SET index returns and volatility 
First, we will take a brief look at the stock index return during the period January 2004 to 
October 2008. The series of SET index return is exhibited in figure 3 below.  
Figure 3 SET index returns from January 2004 to October 2008 
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Here, it can be seen that on the very beginning of the study period (in a purple circle), the 
index returns are moderately fluctuate. I conjecture that, the political factors which caused 
this fluctuation might be the violence in the Southern area of the country which, as stated 
by the government at that time, reached the critical stage and it seems that the government 
encountered a difficulty in bringing rest back to the area. However, this fluctuation gradually 
faded as time goes by and the stock market was back to a consistency stage during the 
middle of the study period. 
Stock returns exhibited an extremely big plunge and jump again after the middle of the 
period as shown in a blue oval. This corresponds to the September 19, 2006 coup incident 
and the frequent demonstrations by the PAD. Therefore, it can be roughly said that coup 
had a considerable effect on the overall stock market. Finally, after the coup, the stock 
market turned to its normal situation for a short period of time and then exhibited a slight 
fluctuation during the end of the study period as shown in a yellow circle. This might be 
again caused by the repeated protests by either red or yellow shirts which indicated a vital 
instability of the political situation in the country. 
In the same way with the stock index returns, stock market volatility also exhibited a similar 
movement as well. As shown in figure 4 below, a moderate fluctuation was found at the 
beginning of the study period followed by a quite stable volatility. During September 2006, 
volatility is at its peak and get back to a fair variability again around the period after 
September 2006 to the end of the study period. Overall, the stock index returns and 
volatility graphs both imply that, more or less, political risks have some influences on these 
indices especially on the period in which coup took place. 
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Figure 4 Stock index volatility 
 
4.3.2) Relationship between stock prices and political news 
Another issue worthwhile for an inspection is how stock prices respond to the release of 
major political news. Our expectation is that stock price should be decreased on the day in 
which bad news has been announced and vice versa for the day in which good news has 
been announced. The next graph plots daily stock price with the red and blue dots 
representing negative and positive political news in each day, respectively. One interesting 
remark observed from the graph is that, in most of the days, the rise(fall) in the stock prices 
is associated with the release of favorable(unfavorable) news. Furthermore, it can be 
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unfavorable news, for example, at the end of the study period. In conclusion, I think that 
this graph provides some hints about the relationship between political news and stock 
prices though not so obviously.  
48 
 
Figure 5 Stock prices and political news 
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4.3.3) Non-normality 
Next, I will focus on the investigation of the distribution of the stock index data. More 
specifically, I would like to test whether the data are non-normally distributed or not as the 
underlying assumption of the methodology used in this study (GARCH model) is the non-
normality property of the stock index. Normally, the simplest way to investigate data 
distribution is to take a look at its histogram. Figure 6 draws a histogram of the SET index 
returns from January 2004 to October 2008. As can be seen, stock returns are non-normally 
distributed with a high peak, slight negative skewness and a fat tail where most 
observations concentrated around the average and a relatively large number of 
observations that are far from average. The skewness and fat-tailed of the stock returns 
distribution can be verified through a normal qq line which plots the quartile of the sample 
of our data against the normal theoretical quantile. The qq plot presented below in figure 7 
exhibits a split at both ends of the sample line from a theoretical line which is an obvious 
evidence of a heavy tail.  
In order to further validate the non-normality feature of the stock returns distribution, the 
statistics values shown below in table 1 provide many evidences supporting the assumption 
of non-normality. The easiest way to investigate the non-normality feature of the stock 
returns is to examine the value of mean and median. Generally, if the data are normally 
distributed, the mean and median should be the same value. However, according to table 1, 
the mean and median of our returns data are somewhat different. Also, standard deviation 
can be used as one of the criteria of non-normality property. Here, the standard deviation 
value is approximately equal to 0.014 which is less than 1 or  
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Figure 6 Histogram of SET index returns                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the standard deviation of a normal distribution. Finally, the evidence of negative skewness 
and heavy tail can be seen through the skewness and kurtosis statistics which here equal to 
-1.014 and 19.97, respectively. Since the skewness is less than zero, this is an indicative of a 
left skewed distribution. For the kurtosis, this value is an extremely large value (normally, it 
should equal to three) so it can be concluded that our data set have a leptokurtic 
distribution. In other words, there is a high probability for the extreme values in the data 
set. 
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Figure 7 Q-Q plot of the stock returns data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Basic statistics of the stock index data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statistics Value 
Minimum -0.160630 
Maximum 0.105770 
Mean -0.000225 
Median -0.000380 
Standard deviation 0.013593 
Skewness -1.013560 
Kurtosis 19.966602 
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Chapter V - Empirical Results  
5.1) Summary statistics of SET index returns and non -parametric test for 
the equality of stock volatilities between event and non-event days 
This section presents the results from a Mann-Whitney test to examine the hypotheses of 
the equality of stock volatility as stated in the methodology chapter. To reiterate, those 
hypotheses are:  
H1: The stock market volatilities between the day at which political news (event day) was 
released and the day at which there is no major political news (non-event day) are not 
equal.  
H2: The difference in stock market volatilities between the event and non-event days is 
higher after the coup incident occurred. 
Table 2 Summary statistics of returns for the SET index and results from Mann-
Whitney test during the period January 1, 2004 to September 19, 2006. 
Panel A: Pre-coup period (01/01/2004 - 09/19/2006) 
a) Summary statistics of returns for the SET index  
 Number of 
observations 
Returns 
Mean Standard deviation 
Favorable news event days 99 0.00451 0.01203 
Unfavorable news event days 159 -0.00484 0.01210 
All event days 258 -0.00125 0.01210 
Non-event days 405 0.00057 0.01214 
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b) Non-parametric Mann-Whitney test for equality of volatilities 
 No. of observations 
(event days) 
No. of observations 
(non-event days) 
z-statistics p-value (1-tailed) 
SET index volatilities 258 405 -10.243 .000
 
 
Panel B: Post-coup period (09/20/2006 - 10/01/2008) 
a) Summary statistics of returns for the SET index  
 Number of 
observations 
Returns 
Mean Standard deviation 
Favorable news event days 56 0.00546 0.01537 
Unfavorable news event days 159 -0.00431 0.01534 
All event days 215 -0.00177 0.01534 
Non-event days 285 0.00073 0.01544 
 
b) Non-parametric Mann-Whitney test for equality of volatilities 
 No. of observations 
(event days) 
No. of observations 
(non-event days) 
z-statistics p-value (1-tailed) 
SET index volatilities 215 285 -5.489 .000
 
 Note: The volatility used in the non-parametric tests is defined as the square of returns. ߪாଶ  represents the volatility on event days 
while  ߪேଶ  denotes the volatility on non-event days. 
Panel A and B of table 2 report summary statistics of the returns of SET index before and 
after the 2006-coup, respectively. Basically, the results indicate a positive returns on non-
event days and negative returns on event days on both pre- and post-coup period. 
Moreover, it was shown that on the event days in both phases, returns are positive on the 
days with favorable news and negative on the days with unfavorable news. With a further 
investigation, it was found that the mean returns for the event days in a post-coup period is 
less than that in a pre-coup period (-0.00177 and -0.00125, respectively) and vice versa for 
the non-event days.  Also, there is an increase in the standard deviation in all cases in the 
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post-coup period. All of these results imply that the release of political news does have 
some effects on the stock market returns and there is a sign that the coup has strengthened 
the effect of political news on stock market returns and volatilities.  
Table 2 presents the results from a Mann-Whitney test for the equality of SET index 
volatilities. This test is based on the null hypothesis that the stock index volatilities are equal 
for the event and non-event days (H0: ߪேଶ ൌ ߪாଶ) while the null hypothesis is that the stock 
volatility is higher for the event days (H1: ߪேଶ ൏ ߪாଶ). The result from Mann-Whitney test 
presented in the above table indicates a p-value of 0.000 which means that, at a 95% 
confident level, we can reject the null hypothesis and claim that stock market volatilities are 
significantly different between the event and non-event days for both pre- and post-coup 
period. In particular, the result suggests that stock market volatilities are higher in the event 
days. This evidences the impact of political news on SET index volatilities.  
5.2) Results from GARCH model  
In this section, the other two hypotheses will be tested which are: 
H3: Major political news has a significant impact on both stock market returns and volatility. 
H4: The impact of major political news on stock market returns and volatility was amplified 
after the coup incident. 
By using a GARCH model, the relationship between the release of political news and the 
stock returns and volatility will be investigated as well as the direction and magnitude of this 
relationship. The dummy variables have been added into the model in order to explore how 
favorable and unfavorable political news affects stock returns and volatility and, in what 
way, this effect changes after the coup has been executed. Note that, when estimating the 
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model, since the SET index is calculated based on the stock  ‘ĐůŽƐŝŶŐ ? prices, instead of 
matching political news on previous day with ƚŽĚĂǇ ?Ɛ ƉƌŝĐĞ ĂƐ ĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ
model, I will use the news on current period to investigate the effect of news release on 
current stock returns. This is based on the assumption that investors will respond 
immediately after the news was issued in the morning and the reaction will be noticeable in 
the evening on the same day before the closing time of stock market. 
Table 3 Results from GARCH model 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
Mean returns (ࡾ࢚) ࢇ૙ 0.00074 
(0.232) 
0.00078 
(0.282) 
0.00066 
(0.299) 
0.00024 
(0.520) ࢇ૚ -0.59204 
(0.916) 
- 0.89588 
(0.867) 
-4.36389  
(0.357) 
-0.42371 
(0.729) ࢇ૛ 0.03959  
(0.234) 
0.03369 
(0.297) 
0.03379  
(0.278) 
0.22923 
(0.268) ࢻ૜ 0.00031 
(0.764) 
0.00015 
(0.870) 
0.00011  
(0.911) 
0.001 
(0.116) ࢻ૝ 0.00472*** 
(0.000) 
0.00420*** 
(0.01) 
0.00483*** 
(0.000) 
0.00554*** 
(0.000) ࢻ૞ 
- 
0.00141 
(0.589) 
0.00083 
(0.746) 
-0.00084 
(0.593) ࢈૚ -0.00401*** 
(0.000) 
-0.00431*** 
(0.000)  
-0.00472*** 
(0.000)  
-0.00429*** 
(0.000) ࢈૛ 
- 
-0.00053 
(0.799) 
-0.00296  
(0.623) 
-0.0003 
(0.732) 
Variance (ࢎ࢚) ࢉ૙ -12.2533*** 
(0.000)  
-11.75665*** 
(0.000)  
-0.80775*** 
(0.000)  
0 
(0.454)  ࢉ૚ 0.07255*** 
(0.000)  
0.05947*** 
(0.000)  
- - ࢉ૛ 0.82137*** 
(0.000)  
0.82654*** 
(0.000) 
0.91718*** 
(0.000) 
- ࢉ૜ 0.52710*** 
(0.000)  
-25.29373*** 
(0.000)  
0.03111** 
(0.031)  
0 
(1) ࢉ૝ 1.24940*** 
(0.000)  
1.43736*** 
(0.000)  
0.15045*** 
(0.000)  
0 
(0.254) ࢉ૞ 
- 
24.19287*** 
(0.000)  
- - 
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ࢊ૚ 1.94493*** 
(0.000)  
0.71559** 
(0.01)  
0.15211*** 
(0.000)  
0 
(0.798) ࢊ૛ 
- 
26.88231*** 
(0.000)  - - ࢽ 
- - 
-0.16847*** 
(0.000) 
0.32689*** 
(0.001) ࣎ 
- - 
0.03066* 
(0.078) 
- ࢾ 
  - 
2.92365*** 
(0.000) ࢼ૚ 
  - 
0.09143*** 
(0.000) ࢼ૛ 
  - 
0.74694*** 
(0.000) 
Log Likelihood 3472.49 3496.42 3508.782 3583.38 
Notes: 1.The number in the bracket below each coefficient is a p-value of that coefficient 
2.The results are estimated based on the following GARCH-M model: ܴ௧ ൌ ܽ଴ ൅ ܽଵߪ௧ଶ ൅ ܽଶܴ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଷܦܥ ൅ ߙସܦܩ ൅ ߙହܦܩ ൈ ܦܥ ൅ ܾଵܦܤ ൅ ܾଶܦܤ ൈ ܦܥ ൅ ݁௧  ߪ௧ଶ ൌ ܿ଴ ൅ ܿଵ݁௧ିଵ ൅ ܿଶߪ௧ିଵଶ ൅ ܿଷܦܥ ൅ ܿସܦܩ ൅ ܿହܦܩ ൈ ܦܥ ൅ ݀ଵܦܤ ൅ ݀ଶܦܤ ൈ ܦܥ 
Where ܴ௧ is the SET index return in period t, ݁௧ିଵ is the error term, ݄௧  is the time-varying conditional variance, ܦܥ equals 1 on a 
post-coup period and 0 on a pre-coup period, ܦܩ equal 1 when there is a favorable news and 0 when there is no favorable news, ܦܤ equals 1 when there is an unfavorable news and 0 when there is no unfavorable news. 
***, **, * denotes significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
Table 3 reports the results from estimating a GARCH(1,1)-M model (model specification 1 
and 2) as proposed in the data and methodology chapter. Also, another two model 
specifications have been performed in order to examine the robustness and stability of the 
proposed models in explaining how political news exerts an impact on Thai stock market. In 
the table, each specification contains different types and number of parameters. The first 
specification comprises three dummy variables in the mean returns (equation 1) and 
variance equation (equation 2) which are coup dummy, unfavorable news dummy, and 
favorable news dummy. This specification will capture the effect of each type of news as 
well as the coup prosecution on stock returns and volatilities. Specification two adds the 
interacted dummies between news and coup which are ܦܤ ൈ ܦܥ and ܦܩ ൈ ܦܥ into both 
the stock mean returns and variance equation. In particular, the difference between the 
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second and the first specification is that this specification also tries to distinguish the pre- 
and post-coup effect on both stock returns and volatilities. In fact, it is the full-version of a 
modified GARCH (1,1)-M model which I have proposed in last chapter. Specification three 
presents a result from estimating an EGARCH model which is an alternative model capable 
of capturing a leverage effect of the news. When included relevant dummy variables into 
the original form of the EGARCH model, the specification form of the time-varying variance 
equation will be: 
ሺߪ௧ଶሻ ൌ ܿ଴ ൅ ܿଶ݈݋݃ߪ௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߛ ݁௧ିଵߪ௧ିଵ ൅ ߬ ȁ݁௧ିଵȁߪ௧ିଵ ൅ ܿଷܦܥ ൅ ܿସܦܩ ൅ ݀ଵܦܤ 
As mentioned in the data and methodology chapter, the coefficient ߛ in this model is used 
to determine a leverage effect of the news on stock volatility. That is, when ߛ shows a 
significantly negative value, volatility increases relatively higher after the release of bad 
news than good news and vice versa when ߛ is significantly positive. Whereas, the 
coefficient ߬ indicates the magnitude of the effect that political news induce on stock 
volatilities. 
Finally, the fourth specification is estimated by generalizing the initial model based on the 
concept of an asymmetric power ARCH model. After a modification, the specification form 
of the conditional variance equation will be:  
  ߪ௧ఋ ൌ ܿ଴ ൅ߚଵሺȁ݁௧ିଵȁ െ ߛ݁௧ିଵሻఋ ൅ ߚଶߪ௧ିଵఋ ൅ ܿ ?ܦܥ ൅ ܿ ?ܦܩ ൅ ݀ ?ܦܤ 
Similar to the EGARCH model, the coefficient ߛ in this model serves as a measure of the 
ĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌǇĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨŶĞǁƐŽŶǀŽůĂƚŝůŝƚǇ ?ĂůƐŽŬŶŽǁŶĂƐĂ ‘ůĞǀĞƌĂŐĞĞĨĨĞĐƚ ? ? ?If ߛ is significantly 
positive, negative news will induce higher volatility than positive news and the opposite 
case will be true if ߛ is significantly less than zero. For ߜ, this parameter determines the 
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shape of the transformation (or the news impact curve which will be shown later) 
(Hentschel, 1995). If ߜ > 1, the transformation of ߪ௧ is convex, while if ߜ < 1, it is concave. 
dŚĞŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐƉĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌŝƐĂůŽŶŐŵĞŵŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞƐƚŽĐŬǀŽůĂƚŝůŝƚǇŬŶŽǁŶĂƐĂ ‘dĂǇůŽƌ
ĨĨĞĐƚ ? ?ccording to Hurvich et al. (2005), long memory of volatility occurs when the effects 
of volatility shock decays slowly which can be detected by the autocorrelation of volatility 
measures such as absolute returns or squared returns. This effect is empirically observed in 
many literatures (for example, Brunetti, 1999; Yoon, 2010; Dalla, 2009, Mora-Galán et al., 
2004). Note that from the variance equation of both EGARCH and APARCH model, it can be 
observed that the interacted dummy variables are needed to be excluded from the variance 
equation. This is because the statistical package fails to converge the results when those 
dummies are included. 
One thing I would like to inform is that the specification of the time-varying variance of the 
APARCH model is considered to be a general form of the other two models (Bollerslev, 
2008). That is, the volatility of a GARCH (1,1) model (specification 3) is the case where ߜ = 2 
and ߛ = 0 while the EGARCH model can be obtained when ߜ = 0 (Hentschel, 1995). However, 
those four model specifications are all regarded as a GARCH-in-mean model since all of 
them include the variance term within the mean returns equation but we will treat each of 
them as a separate specification. 
5.2.1) An Investigation on the results from GARCH-M model 
Coefficient values of each parameter in the model are presented in the table with a p-value 
of each coefficient in a bracket below. We will first consider the coefficients estimated from 
the model specification 2 which is the full-version of a GARCH (1,1)-in-mean presented in 
the data and methodology chapter.  
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a) Results from mean returns equation  
Beginning with the mean returns equation, according to the results, we can obtain a mean 
return equation as follow: 
ܴ௧ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ?െ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ?ߪ௧ଶ ൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ?ܴ௧ିଵ ൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ?ܦܥ ൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ?ܦܩ ൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ?ܦܩ ൈ ܦܥെ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ?ܦܤ െ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ?ܦܤ ൈ ܦܥ ൅ ݁௧ 
It was found that the coefficients of both favorable and unfavorable news dummy variables 
(ܽସ and ܾଵ) are strongly significant at a 95% confidence level. This implies that political news 
(both positive and negative) do have a significant effect on SET index returns. The negative 
coefficient for unfavorable news dummy and positive coefficient for favorable news dummy 
are sensible and consistent with our expectation that bad news would cause a decrease in 
stock returns and vice versa for good news. Surprisingly, the magnitude of these effects 
seems to be similar as the absolute value of good and bad news coefficients is not so 
different (0.0042 for positive news and 0.00431 for negative news). Therefore, favorable 
news increase stock returns by a similar amount with the decrease in stock returns due to a 
release of unfavorable news (approximately 4%). This result implies the symmetric effect of 
political news on stock returns.  
For the coup dummy, the coefficient ܽଷ is not significant and so does the coefficient of the 
interacted dummy variables (ܽହ and ܾଶ). This suggests that the September 19, 2006 coup 
does not have any significant effect on stock returns at all. A possible explanation for this 
insignificant result might be that most firms may expect this undemocratic action to occur 
and have prepared sŽŵĞƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐŽƌƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚĂ ĨĂůů ŝŶĂĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐƐƚŽĐŬƉƌŝĐĞ
beforehand. Consequently, the adverse effects of coup on stock returns were alleviated 
ƚŚŽƵŐŚĐŽƵƉƉƌŽŶĞƚŽďĂĚůǇĂĨĨĞĐƚƐ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ?ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞĂŶĚ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ?&ŝŶĂůůǇ ?
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the influence of volatility on SET index returns measured by the coefficient (ܽଵ) displays a 
negative but insignificant value. Hence, we fail to find an evidence of a significant risk 
premium required by investors. In other words, the result does not support the presence of 
a tradeoff between risks and returns.  
b) Results from variance equation  
The results from the model estimation suggest a variance equation as follow: 
ߪ௧ଶ ൌ െ ? ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ? ൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ?݁௧ିଵ ൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ?ߪ௧ିଵଶ െ  ? ?Ǥ ? ? ? ?ܦܥ ൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ?ܦܩ ൅  ? ?Ǥ ? ? ? ?ܦܩ ൈ ܦܥ൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ?ܦܤ ൅  ? ?Ǥ ? ? ? ?ܦܤ ൈ ܦܥ 
A similar pattern was also found in the variance equation. The coefficients of both good and 
bad news dummy variables (ܿସ and ݀ଵ) are strongly significant at a 95% confident level 
which is an indicative of a significant impact of political news on SET index volatility. For the 
direction of the effect, since both ܿସ and ݀ଵ are positive, it can be concluded that good and 
bad political news all cause a rise in stock volatility but with higher magnitude for favorable 
news (ܿସ is higher than ݀ଵ) which is opposite to what I have expected. Regarding to the 
results, positive political news increase volatility by 1.44 unit whereas negative news 
increase volatility by 0.72. Contrary to the results from mean returns equation, the 
coefficient of coup dummy variable (ܿଷ) is significantly negative with an interestingly low 
value. This provides an unbelievable implication that coup has a significant effect on SET 
index volatility in a way that it extremely reduced market volatility. On the period after 
ĐŽƵƉ ?ƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚĞĚĚƵŵŵǇǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐ ?ĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐ ?ܿହ and ݀ଶ) are both significantly positive 
but the coefficient of bad news interacted dummy is a little higher. This provides a 
conclusion that this military coup contributed a very important implication to stock volatility 
and it has amplified the effect of political news on stock market volatility and negative news 
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cause more fluctuation in the stock market than positive news. However, the magnitude of 
the both coefficients is so high (24.12 and 26.88) that I think it is implausible for coup to 
exert this much severe effect on stock volatility.  To examine the volatility clustering or the 
ARCH effect, the coefficient of a lagged error term (ܿଵ) was considered and it was found that 
this coefficient presents a positively significant value which is an obvious evidence of 
volatility of the stock market.  
5.2.2) Leverage effects 
In this section, a leverage effect of the news on stock market volatilities will be examined 
through coefficients ߛ from both EGARCH and APARCH (specification 3 and 4) model. The 
result from estimating an EGARCH model produced a significantly negative value of ߛ at a 
95% confident level which means that SET index volatility was increased higher following 
positive news than negative news. Likewise, the coefficient ߬ is positive and fairly significant. 
This supports the indication of asymmetric effect between positive and negative news on 
stock volatility. A similar result was obtained from the APARCH model as the parameter ߛ 
estimated from this model exhibits a significantly positive value which also implies that 
negative news exerts larger impact on stock volatility than positive news. These results are 
consistent with what I have expected.  
The leverage effect of political news on stock volatility can be illustrated through the news 
impact curve as shown below in figure 8. The news impact curve (NIC) is first introduced by 
Engle and Ng (1993). The underlying concept behind the NIC is that positive news and 
negative news affect stock market differently. In addition, even the positive (negative) news 
itself does not cause the same magnitude of impact on stock market between the period of 
bull and bear market. According to Parker (2006), the news impact curve demonstrates the 
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relationship between the news and future volatility. On the horizontal axis is the range of 
bad and good news and this is plotted against the resulting volatility from those news. 
Figure 8 News impact curve 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The blue line in the above figure is the news impact curve estimated from an APARCH 
model. What can be obviously seen, when comparing with the red line which is estimated 
from the standard GARCH model, is the asymmetric feature of the curve. That is, the same 
magnitude of positive and negative news induces a different amount of stock volatility. For 
instance, at ߝ௧ିଵ equals to 0.10 (positive news) and -0.10 (negative news), positive news 
increases volatility to about 0.001 unit while negative news increases volatility to almost 
0.004 unit. Also, another remarkable point is that the marginal increase in volatility from a 
negative shock is higher than those from a positive shock of the same magnitude as can be 
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seen that when ߝ௧ିଵ changes to 0.15 and -0.15, volatility in the case of good news goes up 
to 0.002 unit while in the case of bad news it rises substantially to 0.008 unit. 
5.2.3) Persistence of shocks on volatility 
In this section, we will investigate the persistence of shocks on volatility, according to the 
results from GARCH (1,1)-in-mean model, the persistence measure (ܿଵ ൅ ܿଶ) is equal to 
0.886 and is significantly different from unity at a 95% confident level (by means of the t-
test). This implies that the shock from political news was permanent or the conditional 
variance was non-stationary. Therefore, this suggests that the SET index stock prices are 
affected by the movement in volatility. Moreover, this sum value is considered to be nearly 
close to unity which indicates that shocks from the release of political news slowly decayed 
from the stock market. In other words, there is a presence of volatility persistence in Thai 
stock market.  
Long memory of volatility was also observed through parameter ߜ derived from estimating 
an APARCH model. This parameter is equal to 2.92 and strongly significant at 95% confident 
level therefore it is another indicative of the persistence in volatility. However, this result is 
contradict to what we found above in the mean returns equation that no evidence is found 
ĂďŽƵƚŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ?ĚĞŵĂŶĚĨŽƌĂƌŝƐŬƉƌĞŵŝƵŵĂƐĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌďĞĂƌŝŶŐŚŝŐŚĞƌƌŝƐŬ ?dŚŝƐŝƐ
because, normally, if shock to volatility seems to persist for a long time, an adjustment from 
the market to the discount rate should take place and this, in turn, will cause some 
movements in stock prices and returns as well. In other words, if volatility tends to be 
permanent, there should be a significant impact on stock prices and returns. 
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5.3) Robustness and reliability of the model 
In order to initially examine the robustness and stability of our models, the results from all 
four specifications will be considered together. Let us first investigate the coefficients from 
the mean returns equation, coefficient of a favorable news dummy variable (ܽସ) ranges 
from 0.0042 to 0.00554 and are strongly significant across all specifications. The same case 
ŝƐĂůƐŽĨŽƵŶĚŝŶƚŚĞƵŶĨĂǀŽƌĂďůĞŶĞǁƐĚƵŵŵǇ ?ƐĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ?ܾଵ) as the result presents a very 
narrow range from -0.00472 to -0.00401 in which all of them are strongly significant as well. 
This confirms the results which indicate that positive and negative political news affect stock 
returns in the same direction by approximately the same amount. Nevertheless, the ARCH-
in-ŵĞĂŶƚĞƌŵ ?ƐĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ  ?ܽଵ) moves in a wide range from -4.36 to -0.51 but they are all 
insignificant. For the interacted dummy variables, both coefficients ܽହ and ܾଶfrom all 
specifications seem quite stable with a similar insignificant p-value which suggests that after 
the coup, negative news did not have any significant effect on SET index returns. Finally, the 
coefficient of a lagged return (ܽଵ) in all specifications are negative but quite fluctuates. 
However, none of these coefficients is significant so I think this can be neglected since it 
does not provide any important implication. 
For the variance equation, note again that the interacted dummy variables cannot be 
contained in the APARCH and EGARCH model since the statistical package was failed to 
converge the results when those variables are included. The range of favorable news 
ĚƵŵŵǇǀĂƌŝĂďůĞ ?ƐĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ?ܿସ) is fairly wide (from 0 to 1.44), all are positive and strongly 
significant except the one estimated by an APARCH model. Therefore, the implication from 
these coefficients is identical, that is, positive news plays a significant role in the increase of 
volatility. The ARCH effect or coefficient ܿଵ in the first two specifications shows a very 
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similar value and are strongly significant which evident the presence of volatility clustering. 
For the coup dummy variable, the coefficients (ܿଷ) is extremely inconsistent with a very 
wide range from -25 in the GARCH (1,1)-M to 0.03 in the EGARCH model where all are 
significant at 95% confidence level. Though the stock volatility estimated by EGARCH model 
is based on the log scale, this is still considered to be a very fluctuate set of coefficients. 
>ŝŬĞǁŝƐĞ ?ƚŚĞƵŶĨĂǀŽƌĂďůĞŶĞǁƐĚƵŵŵǇ ?ƐĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ?݀ଵ) is pretty fluctuates across all four 
specifications and decrease to zero in the APARCH model but with an insignificant value.  
Now, we will go on to consider the leverage effect of political news on stock volatility 
captured by each model. In the GARCH (1,1)-M model, this asymmetric effect is captured by 
adding the favorable and unfavorable news dummy variables into the conditional variance 
equation. The coefficients of these dummy variables are ܿସ and ݀ଵ which are all positive and 
strongly significant but with different magnitude. This provides a robust evident that 
positive and negative news have different effect on stock volatility. In particular, the 
coefficient of bad news interacted dummy is higher than a good news interacted dummy 
which ŝŵƉůŝĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ďĂĚ ŶĞǁƐ ĐĂƵƐĞ ůĂƌŐĞƌ ǀŽůĂƚŝůŝƚǇ ƚŚĂŶ ŐŽŽĚ ŶĞǁƐ ŝŶ dŚĂŝůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ƐƚŽĐŬ
market. The results from the EGARCH and APARCH model also support the asymmetric 
effect of the news. A significantly negative value of ߛ in EGARCH model and a positive value 
in APARCH model show that leverage effect do exist in stock volatility.  
Apart from the investigation through the stability of the coefficients, we will also consider 
the suitability of each model specification in explaining the effect of political news on Thai 
stock market. Here, the log likelihood value provided in the last row of table 3 will be used 
to determine the performance of each model specification. Roughly speaking, this value 
implies the appropriateness of the model fitted; the higher the log likelihood, the better the 
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fitness of the specification. According to the results, it was found that the APARCH model 
presents the highest log likelihood followed by the EGARCH and GARCH (1,1)-in-mean 
model. Hence, it is suggested by these values that the APARCH model is the most suitable 
model for our data. The reliability of the each model specification can be examined through 
other indexed as well.  Table 4 below displays the results from testing the stability of the 
GARCH-M, EGARCH, and APARCH models, respectively. Consider the results from the serial 
correlation test on both standardized residuals and the squared standardized residuals, the 
results from testing all model specifications at 10, 15, and 20 lagged residuals accept the 
null hypothesis of no serial correlation as all p-values exceed the significance level of 0.05. 
For the ARCH LM test, a null hypothesis of this test is that there is no ARCH error in the 
conditional variance while an alternative hypothesis is that the conditional variance is given 
by an ARCH(q) process. The results indicate that the LM test for ARCH(2), ARCH(5), and 
ARCH(10) all reject the presence of ARCH errors in the data. Overall, I think that the 
robustness and stability of the model is in a satisfactory level. Though the alternative model 
(APARCH) presents a slightly model fit, the proposed GARCH(1,1)-in-mean model produces 
fairly robust results as well. 
Table 4 Results from testing stability and reliability of the model  
 GARCH(1,1)-M EGARCH APARCH 
Statistics on standardized residuals    
           Lag 10 0.9852 1 0.9657 
           Lag 15 0.7004 1 0.8341 
           Lag 20 0.6704 1 0.7400 
Statistics on standardized squared residuals    
           Lag 10 1 1 1 
           Lag 15 1 1 1 
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           Lag 20 1 1 1 
ARCH LM Test    
           ARCH Lag (2) 0.9556 0.9991 0.9774 
           ARCH Lag (5) 0.9991 1 0.9991 
           ARCH Lag (10) 1 1 1 
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Chapter VI Ȃ Concluding Remarks 
Abundant of literatures has concentrated on the role of political risk in stock markets both 
in the developed and emerging countries. Many cases were examined by academicians and 
practitioners where most of them focused on the impact of the release of political news on 
stock returns and volatility. However, not so many studies as I known until now were 
focused on the influence of the extreme political events such as coup, revolution, or civic 
war which is likely to cause additional effect on the stock market. The reason might be that 
those extreme events are rare especially in the modern and globalized era. But, surprisingly, 
Ă ƌĞĐĞŶƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĐŽƵƉĚ ?ĠƚĂƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶĞǆĞĐƵƚĞĚ ŝŶ dŚĂŝůĂŶĚŽŶ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ?  ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ
incident was in world-wide public attention. Since this kind of event occasionally takes place 
and Thailand is viewed as a country which receives little attention but is important in the 
international framework, I think this is an interesting opportunity to study about how this 
ƌŝŐŽƌŽƵƐĞǀĞŶƚĂĨĨĞĐƚƐƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐƐƚŽĐŬŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?dŚĞĂŝŵ of this paper is thus to explore 
the impact of political risks on Thailand stock market during the coup period. More 
specifically, it sheds light on how the latest coup influences the way negative and positive 
political news exert an impact on the SET index returns and volatility. 
One of the recent existing literature which points out the importance of extreme political 
event in manipulating the behavior of stock market is produced by Bautista (2003). Broadly, 
the results from his study indicate the sensitivity of Philippine stock market to a dramatic 
change in the political and economic environment. It was found that large fluctuations in a 
stock price index (or stock volatility) were observed four times during the period February 
1987 to October 2000. Among these four times, the first and the second swing were caused 
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by a series of military coup in the late 1980s where as the third and the fourth occurred due 
to the lifting of the remaining foreign exchange and capital account restrictions in 1993 and 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis which caused a stampede all over the world. The study by 
Bluhm and Yu (2001) also indicates the influential consequence of coup on stock market. 
Basically, by observing the daily returns from the DAX index from January 1, 1988 to June 
30, 1999, it was found that there are mainly three outstanding periods which exhibit high 
volatility: 1) the 13.7% fall in the index returns on October 16, 1989 in the wake of the burst 
merger bubble in the United States 2) the fall of 8.4% on October 28, 1997 due to the Asian 
financial crisis and 3) the 9.9% decrease on August 19, 1991 which is the day of the coup 
against Gorbatchev in the Soviet Union, a political event that severely affected the German 
stock market. It can be seen that a change in political atmosphere such as a military coup 
plays an important role as one of the influential factors that determine the direction of the 
ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐƐƚŽĐŬŵĂƌŬĞƚĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ŝƚŝƐǀĞƌǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐƚŽŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚĞƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨƚŚŝƐ
political action on stock exchange. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore the impact of political news on stock returns 
and volatility in Thailand. Also, it examined whether or not the September 19, 2006 military 
coup has amplified the effect of political news on stock market. In particular, four main 
hypotheses to be tested are: 1) there is a difference in stock market volatility between the 
event day and non-event day 2) the difference in stock market volatility between the event 
and non-event day is higher after the coup 3) major political news has a significant impact 
on both stock market returns and volatility and 4) the impact of major political news on 
stock market returns and volatility was amplified after the coup incident. In order to test the 
first two hypotheses, a non-parametric Mann-Whitney test has been used to examine the 
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equality of stock volatilities between the event and non-event day. For the last two 
hypotheses, due to its advantage to capture the relationship between risk and returns of the 
security, the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity in mean (GARCH-M) 
model was utilized here in order to determine the way a release of political news affect 
stock returns and volatility. A series of SET index which is calculated from the price of all 
common stocks traded on a main board was employed in the model estimation process as a 
representative of the overall stock prices in Thailand. In order to capture the effect of news 
on stock market, a couple of dummy variables: favorable news and unfavorable news 
dummies were included into the model. For the amplification effect of the coup, I added 
other two interacted dummy variables into the model: a favorable news and coup 
interacted dummy and an unfavorable and coup interacted dummy. This modified model is 
based on the assumption that bad news would exert a negative effect on stock returns and 
volatility while good news would induce an opposite effect. Also, note that we assume that 
the asymmetric effect exists, that is, positive and negative news will cause an unequal 
impact on stock market. In other words, we acknowledge a leverage effect of the news.  
In addition to the GARCH (1,1)-in-mean model, in order to better capture the asymmetric 
effect of political news on stock volatility, other two model specifications in which one of 
them is considered to be a more general form of the GARCH-D ŬŶŽǁŶ ĂƐ  ‘'Z, ? ĂŶĚ
 ‘WZ, ?ŵŽĚĞůǁĂƐĂůƐŽĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚŝŶƚŚŝƐƐƚƵĚǇ ?dŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐĨƌŽŵƚĞƐƚŝŶŐĂůůŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐĞƐĂƌĞ
as follows. First, a non-parametric Mann-Whitney test indicates that stock volatilities on 
event day are significantly different from those of non-event day. In particular, the test does 
not reject an alternative hypothesis that volatilities on event day are larger. Second, the 
results from GARCH (1,1)-in-mean model estimation indicate that favorable and unfavorable 
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political news do have a significant impact on stock returns in a way that favorable news 
increase stock returns by about 4% and vice versa for unfavorable news. Similar to stock 
returns, the result also suggests that favorable and unfavorable news causes a significant 
effect on stock volatility by increasing volatility on the day in which both types of news was 
released. For the effect of coup, it was found that coup has not imposed any significant 
effect on stock returns also it did not significantly amplify the impact of political news on 
stock returns. However, the estimation from the GARCH (1,1)-in-mean model indicates an 
unbelievable result that there is an extremely large effect of military coup on stock volatility 
in both pre- and post-coup period. Finally, we found an evidence of volatility clustering in 
dŚĂŝůĂŶĚ ?ƐƐƚŽĐŬŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?dŚĂƚŝƐ ?ůĂƌŐĞĨůƵĐƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƐƚŽĐŬŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚǁĂƐŽĨƚĞŶĨŽůůŽǁĞĚďǇ
large fluctuation and the same occurs with small fluctuation. 
An asymmetric feature of the impact of political news on stock market volatility has been 
investigated in this study as well. Summarily, an obvious evidence of the asymmetric effect 
of political news on stock volatility is found in the analysis. All of the results from estimating 
GARCH (1,1)-in-mean, EGARCH, and APARCH model specification indicates a stylized fact 
that unfavorable political news exert a larger increase in stock volatility than favorable 
political news of the same amount. This has been illustrated by means of a news impact 
curve presented in the last chapter. Furthermore, the exploration of the persistence of 
shocks from the release of political news on volatility is also presented in this study. The 
results from both GARCH-in-mean and APARCH model estimation indicate a presence of 
long memory of stock volatility during the study period. That is, it was found that the impact 
ŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŶĞǁƐŽŶƐƚŽĐŬǀŽůĂƚŝůŝƚǇǁĂƐĚĞĐĂǇĞĚƐůŽǁůǇĨƌŽŵdŚĂŝůĂŶĚ ?ƐƐƚŽĐŬŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?&ŝŶĂůůǇ ?
the robustness and reliability of all three models used in this study was examined. The log 
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likelihood value suggests that the APARCH is the most appropriate model, followed by the 
EGARCH and the GARCH (1,1)-in-mean model. For the ARCH LM test, the hypothesis of the 
presence of ARCH errors in the data was rejected for all three models and so does the 
presence of serial correlation in the squared residuals.  
In many existing literature, similar findings were also discovered. For instance, the work by 
Beaulieu et al. (2002) studying the impact of political risk on stock return and volatility of 
Quebec-based firms suggested that political risk (as measured by political news) related to a 
possible independence of Quebec plays an important role in the stock returns conditional 
volatility but not in the risk premiums. Moreover, they also found that stock return volatility 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨĂĨŝƌŵ ?ƐĞǆƉŽƐƵƌĞƚŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƌŝƐŬ ?/ŶŽƚŚĞƌǁŽƌĚƐ ?ƚŚĞǇĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚ
that the effect of political risk on stock volatility is firm-specific. Besides, a plentiful of 
academic literatures also shed light on the asymmetric response of stock market to positive 
and negative news. A useful example would be a paper by Laakkonen and Lanne (2008) 
which denotes the asymmetric effect of both types of news in US and European countries 
on volatility in good versus bad times. Apparently, the results show that unfavorable news 
causes a rise in volatility more than favorable news. Moreover, the asymmetric effect also 
depends on the state of economy. That is, volatility is increased more by negative news in 
good times than bad times while no difference presents between the impact of good news 
on volatility in good and bad times. These extensive findings of political news on stock 
returns and volatility highlight the universality of the stylized fact about the importance of 
political risk on stock markets. 
Several important and interesting implications were obtained from this study. First, the 
evidence of a significant impact of political risk news on stock market volatility suggests that 
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political risk news should be one of the factors to be considered when modeling stock 
market volatility. This is quite important because the events which cause some changes in 
political situation are a worldwide phenomenon which affects most national stock markets 
(Jorion and Goetzmann, 1999). Second, the results which indicate a significant impact of 
military coup on stock volatility verify that political instability is an influential factor capable 
of convincing the direction of stock market. Though it may sometimes unavoidable for this 
political event to occur, it is crucial for the country to minimize this instability in order to 
ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ?ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƐƚĞĂĚŝŶĞƐƐŽĨĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?It should be 
noted that the 2006-military coup is the third time coup has been executed in Thailand: the 
first two coups happened in October 1977 and February 1991. At the time these first two 
coups were carried out, there is an obvious evidence that coup resulted in a considerable 
loss in the performance of Thai stock market (Kasikorn Research Centre, 2006; Thaipost, 
2009; Sharma and Wongbangpo, 2002). Consequently, it is no doubt that the latest coup 
would also cause stagnancy on the stock exchange operations in a similar way. A final 
implication sheds light on the absence of risk premium required by investors in Thai stock 
market as we failed to find an evidence of the tradeoff between risk and returns. This result 
is inconsistent with the cognitive assumption behind the modern portfolio theory (MPT) or 
more specifically a Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Black et al., 1972) which underpins 
ƚŚĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ĂƐƐĞƚ ?Ɛ ŶŽŶ-diversifiable risk and the price of that asset 
measured by beta (ߚ). If the concept of CAPM holds, high risk needs to be compensated by 
high returns. Moreover, the invisibility of the tradeoff between risk and return also presents 
a violation on the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) which states that the fluctuation 
resulted from any shock should be temporary if market is efficient. This inefficiency was also 
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supported by our findings which indicate the persistence in stock volatility and volatility 
clustering during the study period.  
As much similar with other academic literatures, some limitations do exist in this study as 
well. A first limitation associated with a subjective judgment in the political news collection 
process. Clearly, in the same way as the quality of food depends on the quality of 
ingredients, the quality of the results depends on the quality of input data too. The selection 
of political news, to some extent, has some influence on the accuracy and the bias of the 
ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ?KŶĞƉŽŝŶƚŶĞĞĚĞĚƚŽďĞĂǁĂƌĞŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚŽŶƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨ
the news ŝƐ ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ ůŝŬĞůǇ ƚŽ ďĞ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ǁŝƚŚ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ? ǀŝĞǁƉŽŝŶƚ ? Ɛ Ă ƌĞƐƵůƚ ? ƐŽŵĞ
news might be included in the data set though it is considered to be negligible by investors. 
Nonetheless, as stated in the earlier chapter, I have tried to minimize this problem as much 
as possible by excluding the news with ambiguous headlines from the data set. A second 
limitation relates to the availability of the data. According to our findings, there are some 
points which are not in line with our expectation, for example, an absence of the tradeoff 
between risk and stock returns, or the insignificant impact of military coup on stock returns 
though the effect on stock volatility is presented. One of the reasons for this unanticipated 
results might be that the effect of coup on the returns of stocks in different sectors was 
offset each other. That is, this political coup may induce an impact merely on some sectors 
such as financial, services, or property and construction industries but not the others. As 
noted by a director of the Bank of Thailand (BoT), though the economy as a whole has not 
been affected by the latest coup, the financial and credit also property and construction 
industries in the southern part of Thailand is showing a slow down (Thaisouth Team, 2006). 
Likewise, Thakoon Boonparn (2010), an editor of an independence press website named 
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 ‘sŽŝĐĞds ? ?ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƚŽƵƌŝƐŵŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ŝƐ ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐƐĞĐƚŽƌ ĨƌŽŵ
this coup incident. However, due to the availability of the data, the historical SET index data 
categorized by each industry in Thailand are not usually published, the impact of coup on a 
specific sectors is thus cannot be investigated. 
A third limitation is that though it was shown that political risk exerts a significant impact on 
the overall stock volatility, this result cannot be completely relied on. This is because the 
movement in SET index historical data during the study period does not resulted from only 
the political incidents but it also takes account of other important events in the country 
around that time. For instance, one event which is most likely to influence the performance 
ŽĨ dŚĂŝ ƐƚŽĐŬ ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĐƌƵĚĞƐĐĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ  ‘ďŝƌĚ ĨůƵ ? ŝŶ dŚĂŝůĂŶĚ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ĞŶĚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ǇĞĂƌ
2006. As noted by Suphawut Saicheua (2003) in Bangkok Post News, at the beginning of the 
year 2008, it was expected by the public that Thai stock market would soar to its peak 
however the arrival of bird flu and the unrest in the southern part of the country has 
eventually decelerated stock market performance. Last limitation involves the quality and 
reliability of the news data. In some aspects, it has to be admitted that almost all of the 
news extensively published in Thailand are often manipulated by the government and 
related parties. As a result, it is not surprising that those news would be somewhat biased 
and this has an important effect on our results. Unfortunately, this limitation is extremely 
hard to solve and more time is needed for a liberty of media to prevail more vastly in the 
country. As a conclusion, a final point that should be noted here is the area of plausible 
future research on this topic. In support of a result which has an implication on the 
ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? Ă ŵŽƌĞ ƉƌŽĨŽƵŶĚ ĂŶĚ ŝŶƚĞŶƐŝǀĞ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ďǇ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĂů
cause that retard a stock market performance is identified as well as the impact of political 
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risk on option and future markets should be conducted. I believe that this will lead to a 
ŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůŵĂƌŬĞƚ
and a strategy to strengthen the political stability in Thailand. 
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Appendix: Headlines in the Bangkok Post newspaper which appeared on each event day 
Date Headline 
Good News 
(+)/  
Bad News (-)  
06/01/04 Army writes its own news  - 
07/01/04 PM lambastes army, Wan Nor  - 
08/01/04 Army team to probe murder  + 
09/01/04 Thaksin tells non-security govt officials to button lips  + 
12/01/04 Army to train troops to become reporters  + 
14/01/04 Army informant's throat slit  - 
16/01/04 Thaksin, Abdullah agree on development of border area  + 
19/01/04 Thaksin says martial law necessary  - 
20/01/04 Muslim clerics warn Thaksin to take care investigating schools  - 
21/01/04 Army warns ponoh fugitives  - 
22/01/04 Draftees gathered outside army camp on night of raid  - 
23/01/04 Key separatists met in Malaysia before attack on army camp  - 
27/01/04 Army sets 8-month target to quell unrest  + 
30/01/04 Senators urge debate on govt record  - 
02/02/04 Army chief defends military operations  - 
03/02/04 Poor must be given chance, says Thaksin  + 
04/02/04 Thaksin seeks ideas from local leaders  + 
05/02/04 Thaksin insists bid to scrap local elections is democratic  + 
06/02/04 Suspect in raid on army camp linked to JI  - 
09/02/04 TRT offers to supply funds for by-election  + 
10/02/04 Thaksin 'doing all he can' to win back foreign confidence  + 
11/02/04 Muslims living in fear can ask for protection from the army  + 
16/02/04 Army praises district office for imposing 10pm curfew on teens  - 
17/02/04 Army to build road and fence to seal border with Malaysia  + 
18/02/04 Army chief firm on keeping martial law  - 
19/02/04 Defining times for PM Thaksin  - 
20/02/04 Thaksin challenges Songkhla voters  - 
23/02/04 Election staff scared, volunteers scarce  - 
24/02/04 Staff threaten mass protest to stop Egat stock exchange float  - 
25/02/04 Quick lifting of red zones causes alarm  - 
27/02/04 Army to build road and fence to seal border with Malaysia  + 
01/03/04 Abhisit slams 'ineffective' rejig  - 
02/03/04 Unions plan huge Govt House protest  - 
03/03/04 Protest leaflets greet cabinet  - 
04/03/04 Chaisit says army insiders not involved in Jan 4 weapons raid  + 
08/03/04 Army hotline for public complaints  + 
09/03/04 Army communities nationwide eligible for B1m village fund  + 
10/03/04 Thaksin regime 'undemocratic'  - 
11/03/04 Forgive and forget, says Thaksin  + 
12/03/04 Banyat sees Songkhla by-election shattering TRT dream  - 
15/03/04 Egat workers take protest to provinces  - 
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17/03/04 Prommin: It's summer, protest must end  + 
18/03/04 Pisarn made new chief of Fourth Army  + 
22/03/04 A civilised protest  + 
23/03/04 Egat union insists protest legal, despite Labour Ministry warning  - 
24/03/04 Mass rally to be held  - 
25/03/04 Union says protest will last till May  - 
29/03/04 Sanam Luang rally draws nearly 10,000  - 
30/03/04 Army informants in parley with key separatist leaders  + 
12/04/04 Thaksin to visit trouble spots  + 
16/04/04 Thaksin goes on PR offensive  + 
21/04/04 PM dismisses possibility of early election  + 
22/04/04 Grenades greet visit by Thaksin  + 
23/04/04 Banyat unconvinced election call imminent  + 
28/04/04 Violence at Krue Se mosque - 
06/05/04 Thaksin to create 100,000 jobs  + 
10/05/04 Banyat unconvinced election call imminent  + 
13/05/04 Muslims, Democrats, army support inquiry  + 
17/05/04 New peace plan sought by Thaksin  + 
20/05/04 Sanoh tells unions he will talk with Thaksin on their behalf  + 
24/05/04 Arguing takes up eight hours of debate  - 
01/06/04 Thaksin certain of ministers' survival  + 
02/06/04 Govt says debate 'ineffective'  - 
24/06/04 Army post attacked, ranger killed, two others injured  - 
28/06/04 Army provides guns, ammo to scared Buddhist villagers  - 
29/06/04 Army bracing for another rebel strike  - 
02/07/04 Thaksin is still most popular in Bangkok  + 
05/07/04 Thaksin vows to remain at helm 'in absence of worthy successor'  + 
12/07/04 Students held over 'plan to harm Thaksin'  - 
16/07/04 Thaksin cool to metropolis idea  + 
19/07/04 Army stations cut Apirak's radio pitch  - 
22/07/04 Stay clear of politics or leave the temple, PM tells monks  - 
23/07/04 Army wants ponoh school help frozen  - 
26/07/04 Thaksin team chooses wrong exports for global marketplace  - 
27/07/04 Chaisit expected to remain army chief  - 
03/08/04 Vendors in protest over rent increase  - 
04/08/04 Rent rally gets results for vendors  - 
05/08/04 Academics find fault with Thaksin  - 
06/08/04 Critic lashes out at money politics, graft  - 
09/08/04 Prawase urges Thaksin to resign chairmanship, citing interference  - 
10/08/04 Thaksin in vocal spat with critic  - 
11/08/04 Winning over separatists not an easy job, says army  - 
13/08/04 'Enemies' of Thaksin vow to oust him  - 
23/08/04 Thaksin refuses to accept challenge  + 
24/08/04 Army asks clerics to lift rebels' oath  + 
25/08/04 Pulo, GMIP seek to join talks with army  + 
26/08/04 Army hopes to quell violence by reorganising ponoh schools  + 
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27/08/04 Thaksin orders overhaul of laws  + 
03/09/04 Apirak meets Thaksin for talks on shape of city  + 
06/09/04 Cut in bureaucratic red tape planned  + 
07/09/04 Army plans welcome home party for troops  + 
08/09/04 Democrats launch major rally  - 
10/09/04 Push for election law changes to curb EC powers  + 
13/09/04 Banharn certain PM will not call early election  + 
14/09/04 Thaksin, Apirak need each other  + 
15/09/04 Thaksin declares new drugs war  + 
16/09/04 Army, police chiefs call for unity to end unrest  + 
17/09/04 Thaksin to visit Italy, Sweden this month  + 
27/09/04 Ekkayuth: I want to bring down Thaksin  - 
28/09/04 Ekkayuth joins anti-TRT rally at Sanam Luang  - 
30/09/04 Thaksin gives critics soapbox to stand on  + 
01/10/04 Democrats launch election campaign  + 
04/10/04 Army goes on offensive from Oct 1  + 
08/10/04 Abhisit accuses govt of 'integrated cronyism'  - 
12/10/04 Bangkok sends Thaksin a message  - 
18/10/04 Promises galore at TRT rally  - 
29/10/04 Thaksin: I'm not quitting; no snap poll  + 
01/11/04 Government faces candle-light protest  - 
08/11/04 Political 'dictatorship' slammed by Abhisit  - 
16/11/04 Anti-Thaksin resentment 'growing'  - 
18/11/04 Ammar challenges Thaksin's ability to run the country  - 
29/11/04 Thaksin denies cash for votes  + 
07/12/04 Protest demands senators' ouster  - 
17/12/04 Poll names Thaksin as Man of Year  + 
04/01/05 Call to delay general election  - 
06/01/05 RIVALS BATTLE TO END THAKSIN ERA  - 
03/02/05 Army hopes unrest will ease after Aceh tragedy  + 
07/02/05 Thaksin orders security forces to cooperate  + 
09/02/05 Thaksin optimistic situation in deep South will soon improve  + 
10/02/05 Crackdown on Tak Bai protest dims chances of TRT hopefuls  + 
15/02/05 Abhisit takes Democrat helm  + 
21/02/05 Egat union says election no mandate for privatisation  + 
24/02/05 Thaksin optimistic situation in deep South will soon improve  + 
25/02/05 Thaksin denies split in TRT  + 
01/03/05 Thousands rally in Yala to slam unrest  - 
02/03/05 Egat union says election no mandate for privatisation  - 
03/03/05 Farmers rally to stop Newin getting job  - 
08/03/05 Policeman slain, army patrol unit ambushed  - 
09/03/05 Civic groups plan campaign rally to keep govt in check  - 
14/03/05 Election body throws out fraud proof  - 
22/03/05 Army to deploy more troops in restive South  - 
23/03/05 Army on alert for Krue Se anniversary  - 
24/03/05 Suranand: Thaksin not a dictator  + 
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25/03/05 Straight down to work for Thaksin  + 
28/03/05 Thaksin says he'll make up with Sanoh  + 
31/03/05 Factional anger boils as Thaksin refuses to go to Sanoh's birthday bash  - 
04/04/05 Sanoh calls truce in war of nerves with Thaksin  + 
04/05/05 Journalists accuse Thaksin govt of interfering in news reporting  - 
27/06/05 Abhisit: Policy at fault, not officials  - 
12/07/05 Thaksin: 30-baht scheme not broke  + 
18/07/05 Thaksin assures govt not broke  + 
21/07/05 Thaksin is leading us to disaster  - 
22/08/05 Muslim backed as army chief  + 
26/08/05 Thaksin urges Southerners not to be afraid  + 
01/09/05 Press freedom 'wanes under Thaksin govt'  - 
21/09/05 Thaksin toys with media, reporters not impressed  - 
22/09/05 Army to take 'more serious approach' to unrest  - 
14/10/05 Investors to learn more about protest  - 
17/10/05 TRT decides not to contest Satun by-election  - 
18/10/05 Thaksin: We will retaliate  - 
07/11/05 Die-hard protesters continue their rally  - 
11/11/05 Thousands to gather for anti-Egat listing protest  - 
14/11/05 Thaksin files sixth lawsuit against hosts of talk show  - 
16/11/05 Major rally still planned at Sanam Luang  - 
21/11/05 Thaksin to take Sondhi to court again  - 
23/12/05 Not 'rock bottom yet' for Thaksin  + 
26/12/05 Fourth Army gets new chief  + 
27/12/05 Court allows Sondhi some space to criticise Thaksin  + 
29/12/05 Thaksin a good sport, decides to keep day job  + 
30/12/05 Sonthi: Army won't interfere  + 
03/01/06 Thaksin brushes off criticism  + 
04/01/06 Peeraphan named adviser to Thaksin  + 
13/01/06 Thaksin's political survival at stake  + 
23/01/06 Army may step in if police fail to control rally  + 
24/01/06 Chidchai: Troops won't be needed to keep peace at rally  - 
03/02/06 Huge police force to keep eye on rally  + 
06/02/06 Cabinet shock as PM's critics rally  - 
07/02/06 More academics protest  - 
08/02/06 Govt warns Sondhi not to rally at Royal Plaza  + 
09/02/06 Thammasat students step up campaign for Thaksin to quit  - 
14/02/06 Rally to oust Thaksin of 'no concern' to govt  + 
15/02/06 Sanam Luang 'booked' on rally day  - 
17/02/06 Alliance vows to protest at Sanam Luang  - 
20/02/06 Chamlong 'has right to join rally'  - 
21/02/06 Too little, too late, Thaksin's foes say  - 
24/02/06 Army will leave it to police  + 
27/02/06 Lively protest draws 100,000  - 
01/03/06 Business welcomes snap election  + 
02/03/06 Pornchai refutes rumours of coup  + 
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03/03/06 Thammarak warns top brass against coup bid  + 
06/03/06 Lively protest draws 100,000  - 
07/03/06 Panlop: Military coup possible  - 
08/03/06 PM fights back with Friday rally  - 
10/03/06 Mobile phone companies say protest having no impact  + 
13/03/06 Unions urge workers to joinanti-PM rally  - 
14/03/06 State workers 'entitled' to take leave for rally  - 
17/03/06 Anti-Thaksin group rallies support in Silom  - 
20/03/06 PAD ponders city request to move protest  - 
21/03/06 PAD urges people to join its big rally on Saturday  - 
23/03/06 PAD set to turn up political heat on Thaksin  - 
24/03/06 Election may fail to produce a parliament  - 
27/03/06 Abhisit: PM should see King, quit  - 
28/03/06 Rally renews call for King to step in  - 
29/03/06 Actors premiere on stage at protest rally  - 
30/03/06 Rally move to Paragon worries police, sellers  - 
31/03/06 Fears mount of protest showdown upcountry  - 
03/04/06 Huge protest packs Siam Square  - 
04/04/06 Poll: 70% in Bangkok query election winners' legitimacy  - 
05/04/06 Thaksin, Plodprasop file lese majeste suits against Sondhi  - 
11/04/06 Election questions unanswered  - 
12/04/06 Thaksin: I took my break reluctantly  + 
24/04/06 Govt warns against ballot protest  - 
25/04/06 By-election called off after staff protest  - 
26/04/06 Protest paralyses Thon Buri traffic  - 
27/04/06 Politics, oil prices causing stress  - 
28/04/06 PAD goes ahead with rally plan  - 
03/05/06 PAD rally turnout sparse as court verdicts awaited  + 
04/05/06 Police set to finalise protest cases soon  + 
08/05/06 Anti-Thaksin rallies must end now  - 
09/05/06 
Uncertainties to undermine stability Stock investors cheer election 
nullification  - 
11/05/06 Thaksin confirms he will lead TRT to contest next election  - 
15/05/06 Election panel has no credibility left  - 
16/05/06 Thaksin accused of shirking duties  - 
19/05/06 Supreme Court: PAD support rally not wanted  + 
22/05/06 Students plan protest against EC  - 
23/05/06 Southern turmoil and Thaksin's 'pledge' to end it  + 
29/05/06 Academics say Thaksin not needed  - 
30/05/06 MP murder probe focuses on politics  - 
02/06/06 Confidence in politics falls  - 
05/06/06 Senator mocks Thaksin by taking leave  - 
07/06/06 Yellow shirt fever across the nation  - 
09/06/06 Army chief backs NRC's plans  + 
26/06/06 Bomb-politics link downplayed by PM  - 
27/06/06 Thaksin's foundation continues to crumble  - 
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03/07/06 Commission is ready to reschedule election date  - 
05/07/06 Meechai forewarns Thaksin  - 
10/07/06 PAD: Others may rally outside TRT  - 
12/07/06 PAD rally may be postponed  + 
13/07/06 PAD calls off planned anti-Thaksin protest  + 
14/07/06 Thaksin says another plot hatched to take his life  - 
17/07/06 Thaksin to resubmit poll decree to King  + 
20/07/06 Rally put off until King recovers  + 
21/07/06 Two top army brass launch war of words  - 
24/07/06 Decree does not legitimise Thaksin  - 
31/07/06 PAD plans more rallies if Thaksin won't quit  - 
03/08/06 HM's advice changed face of Thai politics  - 
07/08/06 Prem leads army top brass in show of unity  - 
15/08/06 Call to postpone Oct 15 election  - 
16/08/06 PM gets no protest respite, even in Chiang Mai  - 
17/08/06 Thaksin's supporters, opponents clash briefly in Tak, Phitsanulok  - 
18/08/06 THAI staff again protest early move  - 
21/08/06 PAD calls for reform within 18 months of next election  - 
23/08/06 Non-violent protest goal not achieved  - 
24/08/06 Bomb Found Close to Thaksin's House - 
25/08/06 Election date likely to be extended  - 
28/08/06 PAD protests action against Thaksin foes  - 
29/08/06 Prem supporters rally outside his residence  - 
30/08/06 Thaksin: Polls likely to be delayed  - 
31/08/06 Thaksin set to postpone polling date  - 
05/09/06 PAD to hold more rallies against Thaksin  - 
06/09/06 Prem won't meet anti-Thaksin group leaders  - 
07/09/06 Thaksin to file criminal lawsuit against Sondhi  - 
11/09/06 CSD probes alleged coup  - 
13/09/06 The politics of Suvarnabhumi Airport  - 
14/09/06 Sonthi dismisses coup talk as rumours spread  - 
15/09/06 Panlop warns of coup by 'Thaksin's officers'  - 
19/09/06 Thaksin hints he may take break from politics  + 
20/09/06 COUP D'ETAT IN THAILAND  - 
21/09/06 Most peaceful military coup in Thai history  + 
22/09/06 Anti-coup rally planned for today  - 
25/09/06 Coup should restore unity to country  + 
26/09/06 Uphill struggle ahead for coup council  - 
27/09/06 Mcot board resigns 'for Thaksin broadcast'  - 
28/09/06 Fake bomb found outside shop with letter attacking Thaksin  - 
29/09/06 Thaksin not doing the right thing  - 
02/10/06 Anti-coup driver rams taxi into army tank  - 
03/10/06 Anti-coup activists stage rally  - 
05/10/06 Prem hints Thaksin like Adolf Hitler  + 
06/10/06 Academics rally to Prem  - 
09/10/06 Gen Sonthi promotes 75 army officers for taking part in coup  - 
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11/10/06 Book to explain why coup was 'necessary'  + 
17/10/06 Sondhi: Thaksin traded Thai territory for deals  - 
25/10/06 Third Army moves troops to capital  - 
26/10/06 Midnight uni website closed after protest  - 
27/10/06 Uphill struggle ahead for coup council  - 
30/10/06 Mcot board resigns 'for Thaksin broadcast'  - 
02/11/06 Anti-coup protesters test waters of dissent  - 
06/11/06 Investigator seeks evidence of corruption by Thaksin govt  - 
10/11/06 Military losing post-coup momentum  - 
13/11/06 Thaksin urged to wait a year before returning  + 
14/11/06 Three anti-coup groups hold city protests  - 
23/11/06 Anti-coup group snubs CNS talk offer  - 
24/11/06 Something is odd about the coup  - 
27/11/06 Thaksin to steer clear of politics  + 
30/11/06 Thaksin to be witness in trial of TRT for electoral fraud  + 
04/12/06 TRT allegedly bankrolling rally  - 
12/12/06 Democracy protest passes peacefully  + 
18/12/06 Thaksin's fate to be decided today  - 
27/12/06 Bank plays down Thaksin reports  - 
28/12/06 Up to 1,000 expected at anti-coup rally  - 
29/12/06 NSC retains 2 coup-makers' orders  - 
03/01/07 POLITICS 'TO CHANGE FOR BETTER'  + 
04/01/07 BoT arm seeks damages from Thaksin and wife  - 
05/01/07 Sonthi goes on TV to deny coup  + 
08/01/07 Abhisit: Nation can't afford another coup  + 
15/01/07 Militants target army camp  - 
22/01/07 Protest demands army quit politics  - 
26/01/07 Parties excluded from by-election  - 
29/01/07 FM confirms Thaksin met US lobbyist  - 
30/01/07 ICT looking at pro-Thaksin website's legality  - 
05/02/07 Foreign press seems to love Thaksin  - 
07/02/07 Govt, CNS decide to let Thaksin sound off  + 
12/02/07 Thaksin still sowing seeds of division  - 
13/02/07 A chance to explain Thailand's post-coup situation to EU  + 
14/02/07 ICT blocks pro-Thaksin website  - 
15/02/07 There are problems a coup cannot solve  - 
16/02/07 'Black book' lists Thaksin-era graft  - 
19/02/07 Thaksin's motives a tangled web  - 
16/03/07 FM defends coup before EU ministers  - 
19/03/07 CNS and govt 'have yet to justify coup'  - 
20/03/07 Clean politics can curb corruption  - 
26/03/07 PTV rally draws thousands of Thaksin backers  - 
27/03/07 Anti-government protest at Sanam Luang draws 1,000  - 
28/03/07 Another pro-Thaksin website under scrutiny  - 
30/03/07 4,000 join pro-Thaksin protest  - 
02/04/07 Anti-coup rallies upset Prem backers  - 
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05/04/07 2,000 to rally in support of Gen Prem  - 
09/04/07 CNS' anti-Thaksin campaign  - 
10/04/07 A long road to general election day  - 
17/04/07 Yala rally calls for action on security  - 
20/04/07 Thaksin supporters targeting CNS again  - 
24/04/07 PTV can't use Sanam Luang for Friday rally  + 
25/04/07 City approves PTV rally  - 
30/04/07 Govt urged to put public station on air before election  - 
02/05/07 PR campaign 'to counter Thaksin'  - 
14/05/07 2,000 residents to stage rally at airport today  - 
15/05/07 CNS to hit back at pro-Thaksin website - 
24/05/07 Govt hopes EU will soften stance on coup  - 
29/05/07 A proposal guaranteed to stir protest  + 
30/05/07 banned 111 executives from politics - 
04/06/07 300 gather for counter-rally  - 
11/06/07 Rude shock for Kraisak at PTV rally  - 
12/06/07 Anti-coup protesters march on army HQ  - 
18/06/07 Anti-coup protests lose steam  + 
19/06/07 Thaksin, Potjaman charged  - 
25/06/07 Anti-coup protest fizzles out  + 
26/06/07 Thammarak, Pongsak face charges over election fraud  - 
27/06/07 Thailand's upcoming election won't reduce risk for investors  - 
28/06/07 Government blocks 2 pro-Thaksin websites  - 
02/07/07 Election could be delayed until 2008  - 
03/07/07 Sonthi: Many people upset with DAAD want to rally  - 
05/07/07 Army uneasy as protest spreads in the North  - 
09/07/07 Thaksin free to launch his website  + 
11/07/07 Army warns of fresh bombings in Bangkok  - 
13/07/07 Fake officers offer cash to attend rally  - 
18/07/07 Paiboon backs talking peace with Thaksin  + 
24/07/07 Anti-coup chiefs issue challenge  - 
27/07/07 Thaksin and wife formally indicted  - 
31/07/07 Thaksin vows to fight on  - 
01/08/07 Military once again dominate politics  - 
02/08/07 Government blocks 2 pro-Thaksin websites  - 
10/08/07 Anti-coup protest thwarted by riot cops  - 
14/08/07 Thaksin, stay away _ poll  - 
15/08/07 ASC freezes Thaksin's assets  - 
16/08/07 Soldiers threaten charter critics, rally told  - 
20/08/07 Abhisit urges end to conflict  + 
23/08/07 A POLITE AND STYLISH PROTEST  + 
24/08/07 PM, poll agency to fix election date next week  + 
28/08/07 Election to be held on Dec 23  + 
31/08/07 Thaksin, wife and son may be charged with money laundering  - 
03/09/07 Sonthi denies plans to stay on as army chief  + 
04/09/07 Saprang rejects possibility of coup  + 
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17/09/07 Charter gives power to army, bureaucracy  - 
19/09/07 Public opinion divided over coup results  - 
21/09/07 Keeping army out of politics  + 
01/10/07 Stability still distant hope at election, says scholar  - 
03/10/07 Politics behind Army HQ blast  - 
15/10/07 PPP salutes Thaksin legacy  - 
17/10/07 PPP rally draws huge crowd in Chiang Rai  - 
18/10/07 Thaksin wants ASC's Sak to be charged  - 
19/10/07 Prosecution of key Thaksin backers sought  - 
02/11/07 Politics-weary public shows little interest in election  - 
05/11/07 PAD leaders to run in election  - 
12/11/07 Fiery protest at monument, charges laid against 3 men  - 
19/11/07 PPP tells rally they'll bring back Thaksin  - 
27/11/07 City Hall will allow banned TRT execs to address rally  - 
28/11/07 Thaksin's suit against ASC rejected  - 
06/12/07 'No coup' claim by army chief clears the air  + 
07/12/07 EC wants ban on Thaksin internet site  - 
17/12/07 Democrats file complaint over Thaksin VCDs  - 
18/12/07 ARMY CHIEF SPEAKS OUT  - 
21/12/07 No red cards to be issued before the poll  + 
25/12/07 Anti-Thaksin groups split over result  - 
27/12/07 Election Commission ready for Senate poll on March 2  + 
02/01/08 More than 300 people rally in Buri Ram in support of EC  - 
07/01/08 PPP red cards spark big protest  - 
08/01/08 EC concerned about PPP rally  - 
09/01/08 Crime on the rise as politics grabs the attention  - 
18/01/08 Many disappointed with election result  - 
21/01/08 Abhisit denies trying to subvert PPP attempts to form a govt  - 
22/01/08 Poll panel issues three more yellow cards  - 
23/01/08 Major blow to army in South  - 
24/01/08 Sonthi issues veiled warning to Thaksin  - 
29/01/08 Results show politics still very polarised  + 
30/01/08 Election Commission ready for Senate poll on March 2  + 
31/01/08 Sonthi phones Thaksin for reconciliation  + 
01/02/08 DSI chief won't counter sue Thaksin, Potjaman  + 
04/02/08 Thailand's imperfect election  - 
25/02/08 Thousands welcome Thaksin back home  + 
26/02/08 No need for protest yet  - 
27/02/08 PAD leaders regroup to fight Thaksin  - 
03/03/08 Many unaware of Senate election  - 
04/03/08 A hazard of politics  - 
05/03/08 Source: Samak meets secretly with army boss over reshuffle  - 
13/03/08 PAD to revive anti-Thaksin push with March 28 forum  - 
14/03/08 PPP govt picks up where Thaksin left off  + 
28/03/08 No counter rally to PAD forum  + 
31/03/08 Samak tells of new coup plot  - 
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08/04/08 Seer denies having predicted a coup  + 
11/04/08 Thaksin says he's forgiven everyone  + 
16/04/08 New attempt to dilute Sonthi's influence in the army  + 
17/04/08 Samak confirms early election  + 
24/04/08 Samak claims PAD paving way for coup  - 
25/04/08 Democrats grill govt about Duang's return to the army  - 
28/04/08 PAD drops charter rally plan  + 
02/05/08 Thirayuth warns of coup peril  - 
07/05/08 Army to quell unrest 'next year'  + 
12/05/08 Jakrapob to ban PRD staff talking of coup  + 
15/05/08 Abhisit opts for article change  + 
16/05/08 Red Beret unit to be withdrawn from South  + 
20/05/08 Police to protect rally goers  + 
21/05/08 To avoid another coup  + 
23/05/08 PAD set to stage mass protest on Sunday  - 
26/05/08 PAD rally demands PM quits  - 
28/05/08 PAD confident, says protest will continue  - 
30/05/08 PAD to expand rally, rejects call to ease off  - 
02/06/08 Samak 'must quit to end rally'  - 
03/06/08 Army, police don't want crackdown on PAD rally  + 
04/06/08 Govt hatches plan to end rally  + 
05/06/08 Your demands were met, time to end the protest  - 
06/06/08 PAD kicks off its mini-protest strategy  - 
10/06/08 Protest leader says his life threatened  - 
11/06/08 Army set to deploy its new APCs  - 
12/06/08 Abhisit urges PM to call general debate  - 
16/06/08 Thaksin faces criminal rap  - 
17/06/08 PAD stages protest at EC office  - 
18/06/08 PAD targets major rally on Friday to oust the govt  - 
30/06/08 Abhisit: Samak unfit to lead the country  - 
07/07/08 Farm, slum groups plan rally  - 
08/07/08 PAD rally returns to bridge  - 
09/07/08 Army leader criticises the PAD, vows to stay neutral  - 
10/07/08 Protest planned for Noppadon's arrival  - 
25/07/08 PAD guard killed as 700 opponents storm rally  - 
31/07/08 Army, air force offer to help police protect protesters  + 
04/08/08 PAD threatens mass anti-government rally  - 
06/08/08 PAD denies encouraging military coup  + 
18/08/08 PAD to rally outside British embassy  - 
19/08/08 Protest shuts Hat Yai road  - 
20/08/08 Panlop warns he'll make PAD protest more hostile  - 
21/08/08 Police unit trapped inside the protest  - 
27/08/08 Snap election the best way out of a dilemma  + 
28/08/08 Police to protect rally goers  + 
29/08/08 PM, army chief scotch rumours of a rift  + 
01/09/08 Government supports rally against PAD  - 
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03/09/08 Samak will delay city election  - 
05/09/08 UDD decides to shut down its rally sites  + 
08/09/08 Another coup is possible, says close aide to the CNS  - 
15/09/08 Rural people suffering financially from protest  - 
16/09/08 Thousands of students plan to join rally  - 
17/09/08 Prosecutors set to target Thaksin, wife  - 
18/09/08 PAD unveils its doctorate of demonstration  - 
22/09/08 Hopes for protest breakthrough  + 
24/09/08 ICG: Instability may bring coup  - 
29/09/08 PAD to close five airports in PM protest  - 
30/09/08 Court issues 4th warrant for Thaksin  - 
01/10/08 Security chief says politics a hindrance  - 
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